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Abstract 
 
 
To run a joint venture effectively and without conflicts has in several 
cases proven to be problematic. The need for good relationships 
between the partners is therefore necessary. It is of great importance 
that the partners’ objectives and contributions to the venture are 
clearly described and the control and ownership structure of the joint 
venture is properly defined. 
 
A current example where conflicts occurred is the joint venture 
AutoNova, originally owned 51% by TWR Group Ltd. (TWR) and 
49% by Volvo Car Corporation (VCC). AutoNova was founded in 
1995, but already in 1999 serious conflicts between the two owners 
occurred. The thesis starts by presenting these conflicts actual in the 
case of AutoNova. A comprehensive theoretical framework relevant 
to the actual case including the ‘concept of ownership’, ‘control 
mechanisms’, ‘ownership structure design’ and ‘vertical relationships’ 
is presented. Based on the empirical findings and the theoretical 
framework, the analysis chapter presents how the conflicts were 
handled and how the ownership structure has affected the control 
mechanisms and the relationship between the two owners. The 
analysis leads to the factors that really caused the conflicts. 
 
 
Key words: joint venture, ownership resources, ownership structure, 
control, vertical relationships, conflicts, AutoNova  
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Joint venture is a corporate form traditionally used when a company 
wants to enter into a foreign market. With the rapid development of 
globalisation, technology innovation and intense competition of the 
global marketplace, companies are embracing cooperative ventures 
with increasing frequency as a means of competitive and strategic 
weapons. Hardly a day goes by without announcements in the 
business press of new linkages, partnerships, or alliances. 
 
Joint venture offers a strategy to succeed in a highly competitive 
environment. In such a rapidly changing, highly competitive 
environment, companies are expected to provide sustained 
competitive advantages and they must constantly innovate to get 
ahead of their competitors. Internal expansion seems far from serving 
this need. By establishing joint ventures, companies pool resources 
and complementary strengths together to improve their competitive 
positions in a way that they could not achieve alone. Joint venturing is 
faster, more flexible, less risky and less costly than internal start-ups 
and acquisitions, while simultaneously increasing the partner's access 
to critical resources such as marketing, technology, raw materials and 
components, financial assets and managerial expertise. It provides the 
opportunity to share costs and risks, to acquire knowledge, to enter 
new markets, to gain economies of scale and so on. A multitude of 
joint ventures can be found in the automotive, electronics, 
telecommunications, and aircraft industries, since such ventures are 
particularly suited to high-tech products where the cost of research 
and development is high and timely introduction of improvement is 
important.  
 
The number of new joint venture announcements has risen 
dramatically in recent years, however, this does not mean that they 
always yield satisfactory results. Studies of operational activities in 
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joint ventures suggest that joint ventures are less successful, fairly 
complicated forms of investment. Business week (1986) refers to 
independent studies by McKinsey & Co. and Coopers & Lybrand 
which found that about 70 percent of joint ventures fell short of 
expectations or were disbanded. Other studies suggest that on average 
joint ventures do not last as long as one half term of years stated in the 
joint venture agreement (Berg, Duncan, and Friedman, 1982). An 
independent survey by Weston, J.F., (1997) uncovered many 
examples of joint ventures that came apart either before they started or 
early into the venture.  
 
A current example is AutoNova AB (AN), the joint venture founded 
in 1995 between Swedish Volvo Car Corporation (VCC) and British 
Tom Walkinshaw Racing (TWR) where VCC originally owned 49 
percent shares and TWR owned 51 percent. AN builds niche cars for 
VCC, the C70 coupes and C70 convertibles. Five years later when the 
cars were selling well, the quality was high, and the productivity was 
increasing all the time, on 7th of March, 2000, the production was 
suddenly stopped, the 800-900 built cars were suspended for delivery, 
the 1040 employees were sent home, the factory was threatened with 
shut down. The reason for this was nothing but the conflicts between 
the two owners. Then after three weeks of the locked position which 
cost AN about 1-1,5 MSEK per day, a solution was finally reached by 
the end of that month where VCC got 75 percent shareholding of AN 
and by that has become the majority owner with an option to acquire 
the remaining 25 percent shares in 2003. The production is going on 
again, the employees are back to their plant, and the conflicts which 
had ever been that severe seem to have disappeared. 
 
The event that happened at AN captured our curiosity, leading us to 
write a thesis concerning the subject of joint ventures, since the 
increasing use and strategic importance of joint venturing, as well as 
the reported high failure rate and the complexity of the joint 
management, point to the need to know more about what underlying 
problems affect the operation of the joint ventures.  
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1.2 Research issue 
Joint ventures that combine resources, strengths, capabilities and other 
attributes from two or more companies are undeniably advantageous 
from the viewpoint of competitiveness. However, despite their many 
potential uses and benefits, ventures frequently go awry and create 
problems because they are a much more difficult form of organisation 
to manage well. Joint venture problems tend to be internal, not 
external (Killing, 1983). There are some inherent problems in the type 
of joint ventures. Among other things, first, a joint venture has by 
nature of two or more parents with different corporate or national 
cultures, and divergent and dynamic objectives. These parents, unlike 
the shareholders of a widely held public corporation, are visible and 
powerful and can and will disagree on just about anything (Ibid.). 
Goal conflicts may thus occur, and what is beneficial to one party may 
need to sacrifice the interest of another. Second, the size of ownership 
structure may cause the management problems in such a way that "it 
may take twice as much time to manage as wholly owned business 
units if owners are unwilling to delegate decision making to the 
venture managers" (Harrigan, 1986). Third, a joint venture is a kind of 
long-term contract formed in a dynamic environment, as the 
environment surrounding the partners and the venture are changing all 
the time, the contract may be too inflexible to permit the required 
adjustment to be made. Thus joint ventures are inherently unstable 
organisation forms (Harrigan, 1986). Finally, problems may be 
created by owner's inability to manage the ventures effectively 
(Harrigan, 1986).  
 
The question is how much the potential problems are perceived by the 
partners, how much willingness among the partners to negotiate any 
dispute, and whether there is a way to effectively manage the 
problems. The conflicts which occurred at AN themselves are not as 
surprising as how the two owners (VCC and TWR) handled the 
conflicts-as mentioned in the background, the production was stopped, 
the employees were laid off and the voice between the two owners 
became even tougher when both parties wanted to buyout each other. 
Therefore our main research issues are:  
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What were the conflicts in AutoNova? What was the main reason that 
caused the conflicts? How did the owners handle the conflicts? 
1.3 Purpose 
The main purpose of this thesis is to investigate the conflicts that 
occurred in AutoNova, identify the underlying factors that may have 
caused the conflicts, and explore how the conflicts were handled. Our 
second purpose is to, based on the theoretical study and on the 
problems that we defined in AutoNova case, give some considerations 
for companies to manage the joint ventures.  
1.4 Scope and limitations 
The focus of the empirical study of AutoNova is from the beginning 
of year 2000 when the conflicts began to be frequently mentioned in 
the press until the 31st of March 2000 when they were solved. In this 
case, the conflicts identified have the time and press character, i.e. 
they may actually happen before 2000, but they must be mentioned in 
the press during the beginning of 2000 to the end of March 2000.  
 
We will not conduct any interviews with the purpose of finding any 
opinions on the conflicts, only for completing facts that might not be 
clearly expressed in the written materials available. 
 
The theoretical framework-ownership and control-will focus mainly 
on the factors that are special in the joint ventures, i.e. partners rely on 
a wide range of ownership resources to realise their control on the 
venture. We will not look at those modern management control 
methods such as the balanced scorecard, the just-in-time techniques 
and the computer integrated manufacturing systems.  
 
We will not give any solutions to any specific conflicts, but only 
identify the underlying factors that may cause the conflicts, and give  
 5 
some considerations that could be thought of before the conflicts 
occurred and could be kept in mind when handling the conflicts.  
1.5 Disposition 
In chapter two our methodological choices are presented.  
 
In chapter three the story of AN, describing the sequence of events, is 
presented. 
 
In chapter four a theoretical framework in areas related to this case is 
given. 
 
In chapter five the case as a whole and the factors that caused the 
conflicts are analysed.  
 
In chapter six we will give some final conclusions.  
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Chapter 2  Methodology 
The choice of method used during research is important. A good 
choice saves time and the likelihood that the researcher presents a 
good result increases. In this chapter different methodological 
approaches will be described followed by a presentation of our 
approach chosen. 
2.1 Research approach 
There are three different common scientific approaches. The inductive 
approach has reality as its starting-point. The researcher conducts 
observations in reality and after measurement and interpretation of the 
empirical findings, he forms his own theories based on empirical 
evidence. The deductive approach on the other hand is used when the 
researcher from an existing theory forms hypotheses and by testing 
the theory in reality verifies if it is correct or not.  
 
                  Deductive approach 
 
        Theory   
 
 Generalising        Hypotheses 
 
 Observations        Observations 
 
           Reality 
 
Inductive approach 
 
Figure 2.1 Research approach (Wiedersheim-Paul and Eriksson, 
1991) 
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The third type, the abductive approach, is a combination of the 
inductive and the deductive approach. The researcher is continuously 
inspired by both theory and empirical findings and looks back and 
forth between the two. We read theories about joint ventures in 
general and investigated the reality at AN in particular. We started 
with an empirical study, and from these findings we identified the 
areas relevant to concentrate on. In relation to this we read relevant 
theories from which we became inspired to interpret our empirical 
observations. Our approach seemed quite similar to an inductive 
approach, but we did not form any theories of our own. Theory was 
only used to inspire us in our study, not to be tested or formed. The 
approach towards how to plan, describe and solve our problem areas 
has been the abductive approach.  
2.2 Research strategy 
Wiedersheim-Paul and Eriksson (1991) define three main types of 
research strategies:  
The explorative research strategy is suitable when the researcher has 
limited knowledge about a problem. It is useful when the problem is 
difficult to delimit and there is an unclear comprehension of which 
model is suitable and which characteristics and relations are 
important. It is commonly used during the initial phase of research to 
get a clear picture of the problem. The descriptive research strategy is 
useful when the problem is fairly well structured and the intention is 
not to examine causal relationships but rather to show the 
characteristics of a specific problem. The explanatory research 
strategy aims at study cause/action relations between variables. This 
research strategy presumes besides a clear structure of the problem 
also hypotheses and assumptions that one factor is causing another. 
  
The research strategy of this case was at a starting point of an 
explorative character since the problem was not clearly defined when 
we started our study and we wanted to get a clear picture of the 
happenings in AN. When we had got the whole sequence of events 
and knew which theoretical framework to use we continued with an 
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explanatory research strategy in order to find which factors had 
caused the conflicts.  
2.3 The case study 
According to Merriam (1988): 
 
The case study is used to get deep insights concerning a certain 
situation and how the parties involved interpret this one. 
The focus is on process rather than result, on context rather than 
specific variables. 
Case studies discover rather than prove. 
A qualitative case study is an intensive and holistic description of a 
limited phenomenon. 
The case study is focused on insight and interpretation rather than test 
of hypotheses. 
 
A case study is a study of a specific phenomenon. It is often very 
extensive and should include as many factors as possible to describe 
this specific phenomenon. Case studies are also suitable to increase 
the basic knowledge concerning a specific problem. Depending on the 
nature of our research problem, in order to fulfil our purpose, the case 
was best investigated in the way of a case study. The initial stage of 
our research was to get deep insight in the actual conflicts in AN and 
see how they were handled. From this basic knowledge, we studied 
literature relevant to this topic in order to analyse the conflicts and 
find the underlying factors for them. Since we only investigated the 
conflicts and aimed to find the underlying factors for the conflicts at 
one specific enterprise, performing a case study was a natural choice. 
We did not intend to find the correct or true interpretation of the facts 
available, but rather find the most credible interpretation. The nature 
of the research problem made the result of the case study best 
investigated and presented in an explanatory way. The research has 
not focused on anything that could be measured, in comparison with 
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the quantitative research, which focuses more on presenting the result, 
by quantifiable factors. 
2.4 Selection of material for our study 
Our research has been mainly based on written material, but in some 
cases we have been in contact with some persons at AN, by phone and 
personally, for supplementary details. Foremost Cecilia Kallin, public 
relations manager, but also Natalie Trimming, managing director 
secretary, Carina Karlsson, financial accountant and Ann-Mari 
Robinson, public relations manager. It should be noted that we have 
not asked these persons for any opinions concerning the conflicts in 
AN, only for some background information, not found in the press, 
concerning AN. We chose between two ways of performing the study; 
base it on already written material or by performing interviews with 
the parties. We chose to base our research on already written material 
instead of performing interviews with the parties for basically two 
reasons; firstly because there was a lot of written material available 
and secondly because a process between AN and VCC, concerning the 
take-over, is still going on and maybe it could be difficult to get 
information for fear of calling up old disputes. For practical reasons it 
would also be difficult to get in contact with all three parties, since 
TWR has its head office in England. If we had only got in contact 
with AN and VCC we would not have got all parties' points of view 
which would have been desirable. 
 
The written materials we have used are mainly Swedish newspapers, 
but also press releases, brochures and annual reports. The newspapers 
used are principally Dagens Industri (DI) and Göteborgsposten (GP). 
DI was chosen to get a more financial perspective of the events while 
GP was chosen to get a more regional and social perspective. To get 
an even more local perspective we have, in some cases, used 
Bohusläningen (Boh). It would have been of interest to see if Swedish 
and British newspapers had different points of view of the happenings 
in AN. Before we started the selection of material, our aim was to 
present three stories of the sequence of events, one from TWR’s, one 
from VCC’s and one from AN’s point of view. We searched British 
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newspaper’s homepages and used several databases in order to find 
British articles and material, but only a few articles of interest for our 
research were found, so only one story mixing the three parties' points 
of view of the conflict is presented. Most British articles available are 
from automotive press and do not contain much, desirable for our 
research, information. The time period from which the papers were 
selected was from 1995 when AN was founded until 2000 when the 
conflicts were solved, but mainly from the beginning of year 2000 
when the conflicts began to be frequently mentioned in press until the 
31st of March 2000 when the conflict was solved.  The main part of 
the sequence of events according to the conflicts is included within 
this period of time.  
 
In the bibliography the articles are presented in chronological order in 
order to possibly be used as a very broad framework showing the 
happenings in AN. We have not used all the articles when writing the 
story but they have been a basic knowledge when writing the story 
and therefore they are all included in the bibliography. 
2.5 Source critic 
In order to form an opinion of a source, different criteria can be used. 
According to Wiedersheim-Paul and Eriksson (1991), two of the most 
important criteria are if the source is contemporary, i.e. if it 
reproduces the happenings not long after they have actually happened, 
and if the respondent, in our case the authors of the articles, have any 
personal interest in the current matter. When using mainly daily 
newspaper articles, the criteria concerning contemporaneity is 
fulfilled. Though a potential problem when using secondary data can 
be the authors’ eventual effect on the articles, he/she might not have 
any direct own interest in a matter, but can be partial anyway. This 
ought to be more common in the case of an author of a local 
newspaper than an author of a newspaper of more national character. 
GP is a regional newspaper and the authors of the articles might thus 
not always be objective. When studying the articles in DI and GP it is 
found that there are no major discrepancies in the descriptions of the 
happenings between the two newspapers. Accordingly, the question if 
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the authors of DI might not always be objective arises.  Since the 
conflicts are between a Swedish and a foreign company the Swedish 
authors might be coloured by their origin.  
2.6 Validity 
To test the quality of a thesis the concepts validity and reliability are 
used. In our case the level of both the internal and external validity are 
of relevance. Internal validity means how well the researchers can 
reflect reality, in our case how well we can reflect the sequence of 
events in AN. One way for the researcher to increase the internal 
validity is to use several sources of information. In our case it would 
have been desirable to have more British articles that could be set in 
contrast to the Swedish ones. Also interviews with the parties 
involved would have increased the internal validity. We discussed the 
possibility of sending the thesis to TWR and VCC to let them give 
their comments. But as mentioned, since a process is still going on 
between the parties and it would be difficult to get in contact with 
both parties, we chose not to. We based our study on newspaper 
articles, and in order to get an as complete picture as possible from the 
material available, we chose newspapers with different perspectives. 
Though, when mainly using newspaper articles we can not guarantee a 
complete picture of the happenings will be presented. It is not possible 
to say that this is the true picture of the happenings in AN. The 
sequence of events is presented from the press’ point of view, which 
should be considered when reading the story.  
 
External validity means how well the results from one study can be 
used in other situations, i.e. how well they could be generalised. In our 
case this means if our results could be relevant for other companies. 
This is a single case, and the aim is to see how things were handled in 
this specific case. Therefore it could be difficult to draw any general 
conclusions, but it could be used to see what could go wrong and 
maybe also what is important to think of when entering into a joint 
venture. (Wiedersheim-Paul & Eriksson, 1991)  
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2.7 Reliability 
The reliability of the empirical study describes if a measuring 
instrument gives reliable findings, i.e. if two independent researchers 
would reach the same result. We started our research by describing the 
sequence of events in AN by using mainly secondary data, which 
makes it easy for other researchers to find the material used. We have 
chosen articles relevant for the conflicts in AN, to give a good picture 
of the happenings in AN, and the divergent opinions of the parties 
involved are presented. Even if our aim has been not to affect the 
story presented, we have chosen which articles and which part of the 
articles to use so the story will to some extent be affected anyway. 
Another researcher might have a different selection of articles and 
might therefore show another view of the happenings. Though, when 
using secondary data we will avoid the ambiguities that can arise 
when the researchers produce the empirical primary source material 
themselves.  
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Chapter 3 “The Story” of AutoNova 
This is the story about the car manufacturer AutoNova AB (AN), 
mainly from the newspapers point of view. It can be used to get the 
framework of the large events in the history of AN. In the first part of 
the chapter, the joint venture AN and the reasons why it was founded 
are described, in the second part, the conflicts in AN and the parties’ 
different points of view are shown and in the third part, the solution is 
briefly mentioned. The chapter ends up presenting VCC’s press 
release related to the solution of conflicts.  
3.1 The foundation and the structure of AN 
AN was a joint venture between British TWR Group Ltd. (TWR) and 
Swedish Volvo Car Corporation (VCC) situated in Uddevalla 
approximately 90 kilometres north of Göteborg. In June 1994 an 
engineering contract between VCC and TWR was signed and the 18th 
of January 1995 AN was formally founded, originally owned 51% by 
TWR and 49% by VCC. (AN brochure) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  51%    49% 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Ownership structure of AN 
 
TWR Group Ltd. Volvo Car Corp. 
Autonova 
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The venture was set up to manufacture two niche cars, Volvo C70 
coupe and C70 convertible, for VCC, its sole customer. At the time of 
the foundation of AN the two partners TWR and VCC had already 
been collaborating for some years in the British racing series, the 
British Touring Car Championship, BTCC. They were well known 
and TWR’s experiences and knowledge about racing together with 
VCC’s whole competence seemed to be a good ground for 
cooperation.  
3.1.1 VCC 
The Swedish car manufacturer VCC’s objectives for AN were to 
broaden their product range and when the planned merger with 
Renault crashed, VCC was still in need of new models. Another 
reason why they decided to increase their investments in the 
production of niche cars was the great success with the special variant 
of Volvo 850, Volvo 850 T5R, where all cost estimations of the sales 
were exceeded. (DN, 95-06-19) VCC’s strategy to survive in the 
global vehicle market was to carefully choose strategic areas on which 
to concentrate and for other areas turn to other companies for help. 
The niche that Volvo C70 fitted into was one that VCC could not fill 
on its own, but which would enhance VCC’s global consumer image, 
therefore they had to turn to another company for help. The 
production of Volvo C70 at AN was a part of VCC’s strategy of 
cooperating with other companies, to broaden its product range and to 
attract a new range of customers. (Automotive News, 97-03-17)  
3.1.2 TWR 
TWR, a British engineering company, owned 51% by Tom 
Walkinshaw and 49% by the Italian Benetton family had, since 1976, 
worked with design, development and manufacturing for the 
automotive industry and had collaborated with several large car 
manufacturers. Tom Walkinshaw, the chairman of the board of TWR, 
is a former race car driver who turned entrepreneur and also runs a 
racing team called Tom Walkinshaw Racing. According to his 
associates, he takes a cautious approach in business and for this reason 
he has no desire to build a car bearing his own name, but prefers 
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modest profits with the risk being someone else’s. (Business Week, 
96-12-30) His majority owned, TWR has cooperations within the 
racing area, e.g. it owns 51% of the Arrows Formula One team. It also 
has several collaborations with other players within the automotive 
industry, like General Motors, Aston Martin and Jaguar (Business 
Week, 96-12-30). (TWR Brochure) When AN was founded it was, up 
to that date, TWR’s biggest deal and they expected AN to double 
TWR’s annual sales. (Business Week, 96-12-30) 
3.1.3 TWR’s and VCC’s resources contributed to AN 
The share capital invested by TWR and VCC was originally 100 
MSEK, TWR 51 MSEK and VCC 49 MSEK, and the ownership was 
shared in relation to their respective shareholding. The board was 
constituted by people both from TWR and VCC, with a majority from 
TWR. From the beginning many employees of AN were brought over 
from VCC, e.g. the prospective managing director and functional 
managers. TWR was responsible for engineering and production of 
the cars while VCC was responsible for the design of the car (DN, 95-
06-19; TWR Brochure). In addition VCC also contributed the factory 
premises in Uddevalla and VCC’s large supplier chain. According to 
AN, VCC stands for all contracts with suppliers (DI, 00-03-09).  
3.1.4 Brief overview of the development of AN 
In 1996 a small-scale production of Volvo C70 started. The main 
production did not start until spring 1997 and at that time it only 
comprised the coupe version. After additionally one year, fall 1998, 
the production of C70 Convertible started and during 1999 two thirds 
of the cars built were convertibles. (AN brochure) 
 
As a brief summary of the development of AN from the foundation 
1995 to the end of 1999 some essential figures are presented in the 
table 3.1. 
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 Unity 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Number of 
employees 
Persons 100 370 700 1 100 1 100 
No. of cars 
manufactured 
Cars - - 1 500 10 300 15 001 
Net sales MSEK * 237 271 1 968 3 164 
Net 
Profit/Loss 
MSEK 0 -3 -10 6** 22 
 
Table 3.1 Key figures of AN (AutoNova annual reports 1998, 
1999, phone call to the Patent and Registration 
Office, AN brochure)  
 
*Only total incomes are available (49 MSEK) 
**The item “Net Profit/Loss” for 1998 should not be taken for 
granted. As will be shown in the following chapter of this thesis the 
parties have differences of opinion concerning the result.  
3.2 The conflicts 
During the years from 1995 to 1998, we did not locate any large 
events of interest for our research. The production seems to have 
proceeded as planned. But in 1999 and in the beginning of 2000 the 
two owners faced three large conflicts.  
 
How to share a great deficit occurred in AN in 1998. 
Which price VCC should pay for the cars delivered from AN.  
The ownership question between the two owners.  
 
These three conflicts will be described in more detail in this chapter. 
Firstly the press’ point of view of the events in AN will be shown, and 
secondly the companies’ press releases related to these will be 
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presented in order to get their unadulterated view. It should be noticed 
that the press releases are presented in original, nothing has been 
rewritten. 
3.2.1 AN’s deficit for 1998  
Common phenomena for new car-manufacturing projects, during the 
build-up, are delays in production and lack in quality of the cars. The 
production of Volvo C70 at AN was no exception, but it was not until 
1998 they faced a great deficit. In the beginning of 1998 the sales of 
Volvo C70 coupe was worse than expected and later during the year 
C70 convertible was hit by heavy delays which led to a poor result for 
AN for 1998, after nine months the deficit was already 150 MSEK. 
(GP, 00-02-25) As a result of the decrease in sales and heavy delays, 
AN ran out of money. To keep the factory running AN’s sole 
customer VCC, the same year, made an extra payment of 251 MSEK. 
 
The difficulties to agree upon AN’s annual accounts for 1998 
The two owners, TWR and VCC, had for several years quarrelled 
concerning who was responsible for the increased costs occurred 
during the initial years, and when the deficit during 1998 occurred, the 
quarrel proceeded into an open conflict between them. In September 
1999 AN and VCC turned to arbitration concerning the interpretation 
of the agreement between them concerning how to share the deficit for 
1998, a process that could take up to one year. (GP, 00-02-25) The 
oppositions between them were so large that they could not agree 
upon the establishment of any annual accounts for 1998. When a 
proposal for annual accounts was presented in October 1999 the 
differences in opinions were so large that VCC’s two representatives 
on AN’s board, as a consequence they could not stand behind the 
proposal, departed (GP, 00-01-22).  
 
The owners inability to agree how the deficit for 1998 should be 
covered led to no annual accounts for AN for 1998 being handed in to 
the Patent and Registration Office and AN got hit by several charges 
of delay (GP, 99-12-03). Because no annual accounts arrived at the 
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Patent and Registration Office in time it set a deadline to the 25th of 
April 2000, if the annual accounts had not arrived at that point, AN 
would be liquidated (GP, 00-02-08). In the beginning of 2000 AN’s 
final accounts for 1998 were approved. An extra general meeting 
constituted by lawyers and economists approved the final accounts 
(GP, 00-01-22) and the 24th of February, the annual accounts were 
sent to the Patent and Registration Office. The annual accounts 
showed a gain of 6 MSEK. But at the same time it showed a 
“controversial claim” of VCC of 310 MSEK. (DI, 00-02-25) 
 
The parties' different opinions concerning VCC’s payment of 251 
MSEK 
The payment of 251 MSEK from VCC to AN in 1998 was the reason 
for the differences in opinion between the two owners. On the one 
hand, AN called this payment a onetime contribution, according to 
Tom Walkinshaw, a penalty fee for VCC’s diminished order by 6 000 
cars and the change in production mix to a bigger number of C70 
convertible, in September 1998 (DI, 00-03-24), and besides demanded 
that VCC pay additionally almost 60 MSEK with reference that VCC 
had promised to compensate AN for costs to reach a zero result for 
1998. This resulted in a total amount of approximately 310 MSEK, 
which was the “controversial claim”. On the other hand, VCC 
maintained that the 251 MSEK was not a gift at all but a loan, and 
they had not promised to cover any loss. VCC considers the deficit for 
1998 should be covered by the two owners and be divided according 
to their relative shareholding, which according to Ingmar Hesslefors, 
press spokesman at VCC, is the basic idea behind a limited company 
(DI, 99-12-08). (GP, 00-02-25)  
 
TWR and AN saw the deficit as the company’s costs were not 
covered, and in February 2000 AN, whose board at that time was 
constituted only by TWR, maintained that the additional costs should 
be paid by the customer VCC. (GP, 00-02-23) But VCC maintained 
the opposite and saw the deficit as a loss. According to Ingmar 
Hesslefors, AN were paid by cars delivered according to the 
agreement available, but AN had not followed that agreement and not 
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been that cost efficient as the agreement prescribed. (DI, 99-12-08) 
The partners had completely different opinions concerning who 
should pay for the deficit. The following two quotations are selected 
in order to show the differences in opinion even more clearly: 
 
-“We think we have already paid our share of the loss”, said Ingmar 
Hesslefors, VCC’s information manager. (Boh, 00-02-25) 
 
-“We believe the customer, in this case VCC, should stand the whole 
loss”, said Mike Flewitt, AN’s managing director. (Boh, 00-02-25) 
 
The negotiations concerning how the deficit should be shared 
continued at the highest level between the two companies’ 
representatives, VCC’s managing director Tuve Johannesson and 
TWR’s chairman of the board Tom Walkinshaw. 
3.2.2 The price of the cars 
AN stopped the deliveries  
According to DI (00-03-08), in order to keep the business running 
VCC paid an interim price for the cars delivered from AN. This 
interim price should be paid from the beginning of 1999 until the 
arbitration concerning how to share the deficit for 1998 was finished. 
The interim price was, according to Ingmar Hesslefors, 15 000 SEK 
more per convertible and 19 000 SEK more per coupe than the price 
originally agreed (DI, 00-03-08). But despite the ongoing arbitration 
VCC, at the end of February 2000, informed that they did not intend 
to pay the interim price any longer (DI, 00-03-09) and instead began 
paying the price originally agreed. AN replied by stopping the 
deliveries of cars to VCC (GP, 00-03-08). Tom Walkinshaw 
considered the price originally agreed something he could not accept 
since it would lead to financial problems for AN (DI, 00-03-08). His 
opinion was that if VCC did not pay the interim price, it would be 
impossible for AN to cover its costs and they would not be able to 
keep the production running. In the same breath he described VCC’s 
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attitude as “extremely unreasonable”, (GP, 00-03-08) he considered 
that what AN needed was a customer who should pay the price agreed 
(DI, 00-03-18).  
 
What price should VCC pay for the cars? 
According to The Sunday Times (00-03-12), the price at which AN 
sold the C70 to VCC was renegotiated each October.  VCC’s attitude 
after they stopped paying the transfer price was that they were now 
paying the price originally agreed. They referred to a contract from 
1995 where it was stated how much VCC should pay for the cars. This 
contract was adjusted for changed technical content of the cars and 
other, and via indexation increased the price per car originally agreed 
(GP, 00-03-08; DI, 00-03-17). VCC’s opinion was that if AN was not 
able to produce cars at the price originally agreed it was something 
AN’s management and board had to do something about and should 
not burden VCC. (GP, 00-03-14) Though, AN sustained that VCC 
ordered them to produce cars according to plan without considering 
the costs. According to AN, this was documented in writing in the 
company's audits. 
 
To solve the situation AN, the 7th of March 2000, offered VCC to pay 
a cost price for the cars, but VCC said definitely no (DI, 00-03-09). 
VCC’s production manager, Curt Germundsson, maintained it should 
not be a problem to produce the Volvo C70 at AN at the price 
originally agreed. According to AN, this price was much lower than 
the cost price of AN. Mike Flewitt’s opinion was that it was expensive 
to build cars at AN because the production was so small and implied 
AN would need an additional project of the same size as Volvo C70 
(GP, 00-03-22).  
3.2.3 The ownership question 
Also a conflict concerning the ownership question in AN occurred 
(Boh, 00-02-25). The question was first mentioned in summer 1999 
when TWR wanted AN to manufacture sport cars for Renault, in order 
not to be totally dependent on VCC as the sole customer. Though, this 
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was refused by VCC’s both members of the board in AN with 
reference that VCC did not intend to take any business risks for 
Renault (GP, 99-09-07).  
 
In the beginning of 2000 the ownership question again arose, Tom 
Walkinshaw offered 350 MSEK for VCC’s part in AN (DI, 00-03-24). 
VCC on the other hand, offered Tom Walkinshaw 100 MSEK plus to 
take all AN’s historical costs for his part in AN (DI, 00-03-22). The 
historical costs included the controversial 310 MSEK from 1998 that 
the parties disagree about. Tom Walkinshaw’s immediate counter 
demand was that he wanted 100 MSEK plus a share in AN’s profit 
during 1999 corresponding to TWR’s part of the shares, accordingly 
57 MSEK (GP, 00-03-21). The positions between the two parties were 
locked and none of them wanted to accept the other one’s offer or 
demand. 
 
TWR stopped the production at AN 
In the morning the 7th of March Tom Walkinshaw gave VCC a new 
offer. What it included was not official. Though the offer presented 
was immediately rejected by VCC. Tuve Johannesson found the price 
demanded by Tom Walkinshaw unacceptable and there was no point 
in discussing it (DI, 00-03-22). VCC stated they wanted to take over 
AN and had given a final offer. The price TWR was offered for its 
51% shares (100 MSEK) was not negotiable (DI, 00-03-09). TWR 
replied by the same day stopping the production at AN, and at the 
same time cancelling all deliveries from the suppliers. (DI, 00-03-08)  
 
A lengthy close down of AN could be costly for both AN and VCC. 
To keep the factory at AN running without any production, with 1 100 
employees, would cost approximately 1 – 1.5 MSEK a day. VCC on 
their hand did not only risk a lot of upset customers, they also risked 
being sued by AN’s suppliers since VCC, according to AN, had 
signed the contracts with these. (DI, 00-03-09) The unions’ opinion 
concerning the close down was that it was an absurd situation when 
the production was stopped at a profitable company. The owners had 
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to take their responsibility and solve the conflicts immediately (GP, 
00-03-08).  
 
The discussions concerning the offers and demands can be difficult to 
survey. In order to clearly show the parties' offers and demands of 
shares, table 3.2 is included. 
 
Tom’s and Tuve’s negotiations 
Several negotiations between the representatives of TWR and VCC, 
Tom Walkinshaw and Tuve Johannesson, took place. But the 
positions were locked, and depending on which side to listen to, the 
actual deadlock was motivated once by this, once by that.  
 
The voice between the two owners became tougher throughout the 
conflicts, especially when Ford bought VCC. Ford had several old 
fights with Tom Walkinshaw and made sure the VCC management 
were tough in their negotiations. (GT, 00-03-11) Tom Walkinshaw 
described the negotiations with VCC as follows: 
 
“Imagine that someone tells you that if you do not sell your house 
cheap to me, I’ll blow it into pieces. That is how VCC has acted.” 
(GP, 00-03-16) “I understand absolutely nothing. But it is obvious I 
have never met a company acting so badly as VCC is doing” (DI, 00-
03-08)  
 
Ingmar Hesslefors’ comment was: “I do not know his other business 
relations” (GT, 00-03-11) and Tuve Johannesson indirectly graded 
Tom Walkinshaw’s acting: “I have decided not to slip down in the 
gutter.” (GP, 00-03-22) 
 
Tom Walkinshaw’s new offer 
In an interview with DI the 24th of March, Tom Walkinshaw presented 
a new offer. It implied that he was prepared to start the production 
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immediately and was willing to accept VCC’s offer of 100 MSEK. 
Though he demanded an informal arbitration concerning how to share 
AN’s result for 1998, and 50% of the result of that arbitration should 
go to TWR. VCC’s line through the negotiations had been they were 
willing to pay 100 MSEK and take all AN’s historical costs (310 
MSEK) for TWR’s shares in AN, and kept to this as a final offer. But 
the 29th of March Ingmar Hesslefors stated that VCC kept the doors 
open and they had asked Tom Walkinshaw to present the offer 
presented in DI the 24th of March directly to VCC. (DI, 00-03-29) 
 
Date Part Offer/Demand 
January* TWR  Offered VCC 350 MSEK 
February* VCC Offered TWR 100 MSEK + take all AN’s 
historical costs (310 MSEK) 
February* TWR Demanded 100 MSEK + share in AN’s 
gain for 1999 (57 MSEK) 
March 7 TWR Unofficial offer 
March 24 TWR Demanded 100 MSEK + 50% of the result 
of an informal arbitration, concerning how 
to share AN’s result for 1998  
 
Table 3.2 The parties' offers and demands for their shares  
 
* No exact dates for the three first offers/demands are available. 
 
The unions turned against TWR 
Two other forces during the conflicts were the unions and Jacques 
Nasser, Ford’s managing director and CEO. The unions took a neutral 
position when the conflicts first occurred and only wanted the parties 
to agree and start the production again. But after a meeting, the 15th of 
March, between the unions and TWR, they chose to take VCC’s side 
in the conflict and openly demanded that VCC take over. The unions 
saw a takeover by VCC as the only rescue for AN. Tom Walkinshaw 
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had at the meeting presented three possible alternatives for AN’s 
future: To continue as before, to manufacture other car models with 
maybe 100 employees or to completely close down the factory. 
According to the unions, they had got the information that he was not 
quite alien to closing the factory down already in June or July. They 
assumed that Tom Walkinshaw only wanted to make as much money 
as possible before he left AN. They also considered TWR not to have 
the resources to run and develop AN and therefore openly took VCC’s 
side in the conflict. They thought the situation at AN had completely 
got off the track and wanted Tom Walkinshaw off, as owner of AN.  
 
During a visit to Göteborg the 29th of March Jacques Nasser, in an 
interview with GP, also commented on the conflicts that had arisen 
and said he rather saw a fast solution. He thought Tuve Johannesson 
and Tom Walkinshaw to be grown up boys and was sure they would 
sit down to calm and reasonably find out what was right and good for 
AN, and reach a good agreement (GP, 00-03-30). 
3.3 The Solution 
After a long period of time the conflict was finally solved. The 
solution came sometime during the night between the 30th and the 31st 
of March when Tom Walkinshaw and Tuve Johannesson finally 
agreed. As a result of the agreement the deliveries of the about 800 
undelivered Volvo C70 coupes and convertibles resumed already the 
same day and the 3rd of April the employees went back to work. (Boh, 
00-04-01). The agreement implied that VCC increase its possession to 
75% and has an option to acquire the remaining 25% year 2003. VCC 
also broke all connections with Tom Walkinshaw, in racing. (DI, 00-
04-05) After the takeover of VCC, Mike Flewitt was dismissed and 
instead Walter Fortgens was nominated as new managing director for 
AN, he took over in the summer 2000. (TT, 00-07-04) In fall 2000, 
AN changed name to Volvo Cars Uddevalla. 
 
A parenthesis in the context can be that also Tuve Johannesson the 6th 
of June was dismissed from the post as the managing director of VCC. 
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According to what DI learns it was an expected change, several 
internal sources testified that Tuve Johannesson could not agree with 
the highest Ford head as well as his closest manager and chairman of 
VCC´s board, Wolfgang Reitzle. According to DI another reason for 
the aggregated disappointment against Tuve Johannesson and his 
management team was the handling of the conflicts in AN, which was 
treated as any supplier despite VCC owning 49% of the company. 
(DI, 00-06-07) 
3.4 Press releases 
The following press releases are included in order to give the reader 
the possibility to see what information the companies have released 
according to the conflicts in AN. They are not going to be analysed 
but are only included to show the companies unadulterated view of 
the conflicts. 
 
AutoNova 
7 March 2000 
 
THE PRODUCTION OF VOLVO C70 HALTS 
Autonova, mutually owned by Volvo Car Corporation and TWR 
Group Ltd., manufacturing the coupe- and convertible versions of 
Volvo’s C70 series, have been forced to halt the production in the 
Uddevalla factory. The reason is that the company’s sole customer - 
Volvo Car Corporation - refuses to pay for the cars, despite great 
demand in the market. 
 
AutoNova and Volvo Car Corporation have during a long period of 
time quarrelled concerning the correct cost of building the cars in the 
Uddevalla factory. AutoNova demands that Volvo Car Corporation 
stand by the commitments that the company and its auditors have 
given according to costs AutoNova had during 1998. 
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1999 Volvo Car Corporation referred the controversy to arbitration in 
line with what had been prescribed in the partner’s original agreement. 
It was obvious that a solution of the arbitration was going to take time 
and therefore it was determined that Volvo Car Corporation should 
pay an interim price for the cars. 
 
Volvo Car Corporation have now changed their mind and refuse to 
pay the price agreed for the cars. 
 
Under these circumstances there is no other solution for AutoNova 
than to stop the production. No cars will be produced before an 
agreement with Volvo Car  
Corporation is reached. 
 
In attempts to find a solution AutoNova has repeated its offer to 
Volvo Car Corporation, to produce cars to a covering of cost in order 
not to jeopardise the employment and hurt C70’s market image. Since 
Volvo Car Corporation has not accepted this there is no other 
alternative for AutoNova than to stop the production.  
 
AutoNova 
15 March 2000 
 
TWR LEAVES THE OWNERSHIP QUESTION – 
CONCENTRATES ALL EFFORTS ON STARTING THE 
MANUFACTURING 
TWR, main owner in AutoNova, has decided to leave the ownership 
question at that at the moment. Since none of the parties can accept 
the bids offered, the negotiations are now calm. Therefore all efforts 
are now concentrated on getting AutoNova and its sole customer - 
Volvo Car Corporation - to agree upon the price of the cars. 
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- It is important that the production starts again, says Tom 
Walkinshaw, main owner in TWR and Chairman in AutoNova. As 
soon as we can agree upon a price for the cars the employees can 
return to their work and AutoNova can again produce Volvo cars. 
 
Tom Walkinshaw has given Mike Flewitt, managing director at 
AutoNova, the task to start negotiations with Volvo Car Corporation 
concerning the price of the cars. The background to the controversy 
concerning the price originates from a dispute between both parties 
concerning how the costs for the cars should be calculated. 1999 
Volvo Car Corporation referred the question to arbitration in line with 
what had been prescribed in the partner’s original agreement. Since 
the arbitration was expected to take time it was determined that Volvo 
Car Corporation should pay an interim price for the cars. In December 
1999 Volvo began paying a lower price and since then disagreement 
between the both parties has prevailed. Tom Walkinshaw’s 
expectation now is that the price question should be solved as soon as 
possible and that the production should be resumed.  
 
Volvo Car Corporation 
31 March, 2000 
 
TWR AND VOLVO CAR CORPORATION IN AGREEMENT 
OVER THE FUTURE OF AUTONOVA 
 
PRODUCTION AND DELIVERIES RESUME 
Volvo Cars and TWR (Tom Walkinshaw Racing) have today reached 
an agreement in principle regarding AutoNova, which paves the way 
for the company to immediately start production and resume 
deliveries of cars following the halt in operations on 7 March this 
year.  
 
Volvo Car Corporation is acquiring 26% of the share stock in 
AutoNova from TWR, with immediate effect. The remaining 25% 
will be purchased in 2003. The TWR Group will not have a place on 
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the board of AutoNova. Volvo Car Corporation is hereby now 
responsible for AutoNova’s operations following normal EU approval 
procedures. 
 
VCC and TWR do not intend to publicise the contents of the 
agreement, as some details and formalities still remain to be resolved. 
- We have today reached a framework agreement, which takes due 
account of the interests of both parties. Based on this understanding, 
the executive management of AutoNova has undertaken to resume 
production and deliveries and this can be done already on Monday 
April 3, says Tuve Johannesson, managing director of Volvo Car 
Corporation. 
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Chapter 4 Ownership versus control 
The relationship between the ownership and control of firms has 
received attention for many years. Ownership is a combination of 
rights and responsibilities with respect to a specific asset. Scott (1979) 
states that ownership has a dual character, both a legal relation and a 
social one. The legal relation of ownership comprises an owner's legal 
power over a social object. The social relation of ownership refers to 
the actually effective power of possession, which may diverge from 
the legal relation of ownership. The effective possession can be 
structured in a way that does not correspond to prevailing legal forms. 
 
Berle and Means argue that the traditional logic of property involves 
two aspects: the right to determine the use of the assets and the right 
to benefit from its use. When the two aspects of property are 
dissociated, it is possible to distinguish "nominal ownership", which is 
the right to receive revenue as a return for risking one's wealth by 
investing in a company, from "effective ownership", which is the 
ability to control the corporate assets. (Yan, 2000) 
 
The argument can be extended to the study of joint ventures. The 
parent companies are legal owners of a joint venture, but the actual 
power is derived from the joint venture board, which may act with 
some degree of independence. The social relations of the joint venture 
are established by the partners' contribution of resources and 
competencies, but these can become dissociated from the partners' 
ownership rights to protect their respective interests. In a joint 
venture, parent companies provide resources, skills and knowledge in 
addition to their equity contributions. They face the problems of 
protecting the use of these resources when collaborating with each 
other. Therefore there is a strategic motive for them seeking a certain 
level of control through legal rights and social relations. The range of 
ownership resources conveys control and influence over a joint 
venture, both through the formal terms of any contracts and through 
the less formal influence that derives from the partner's possession of 
resources and capabilities. The partner's objectives are more or less 
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reflected in the management of the joint venture. The partner's capital, 
technological and management resources may be used by the 
management of the joint venture as a power base to support the 
pursuit of its objectives. 
 
The separation of the legal ownership and the effective control in joint 
ventures has been recognised by many researchers. Bivens and Lovell 
(1966) argue that it is wise to divide the management responsibility 
for the major functional areas in a joint venture according to abilities 
and not on the basis of the shareholding. Killing (1983) also points out 
that even in the equally owned joint venture, the management does not 
necessarily need to be equally shared.  
4.1 The concept of ownership 
In formal terms, ownership is the legal possession of assets. It is 
normally defined in terms of three fundamental rights which are, the 
right to possess an asset and/or its financial value, the right to exercise 
the influence over the use of the asset, and the right to information 
about the status of what is owned (Pierce, 1991). Other rights are to 
transfer assets and to receive an income or return from them. In a joint 
venture, the parent companies contribute not only the capital, but also 
the non-capital resources such as the materials, management, and 
technologies. These are normally stipulated in the formal contracts 
and agreements among the partners. In addition, there are also some 
other resources provided by the partners without contracts, such as the 
knowledge and skills embodied in the managers, expertise or staffs 
employed by the partners. Thus the ownership rights in the context of 
joint ventures are constituted in three dimensions of the ownership 
resources, namely, equity capital, contractual resources, and non-
contractual resources.  
4.1.1 Equity capital 
Yan and Gray (1996) regard equity as the provision of a capital 
resource to a joint venture by its partner companies, typically finance 
and sometimes land and buildings. Equity ownership is seen as an 
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outcome of negotiation, which represents the relative bargaining 
power of participating interests (Harrigan, 1986). It is associated with 
formal control (Hyder, 1988). The parent companies rely on the equity 
share to gain voting rights, to represent on the board of directors, to 
occupy the key managerial positions, and to obtain profits (though 
sometimes the profit allocation is not in accordance with the equity 
shares but agreed between the partners). A firm that commits the 
greater amount of capital resources gains an advantage in strategic 
control in joint venture (Yan and Gray, 1996). However, equity 
ownership is not equivalent to management control, in other words, a 
majority equity share does not represent an effective control of the 
whole joint ventures activities (Harrigan, 1986, Killing, 1983). The 
distribution of equity control, profit splits, board representatives, and 
other forms of managerial control will not necessarily be symmetrical 
because some partners will take a slight minority equity position so 
long as they can obtain clear majority position in managerial authority 
and operational control.  
4.1.2 Contractual resources  
Contractual resources are those resources other than equity capital 
provided to a joint venture by its owners on the basis of formal 
contracts including technology, management expertise, local 
knowledge, raw material procurement channels, product distribution 
and marketing channels. Yan and Gray (1996) distinguish this type of 
resources from capital resources, arguing that these non-capital 
resources may constitute more important complementary assets than 
purely financial contributions and therefore tend to contribute to the 
operational control. Control may be, for example, over specific areas 
of product and process technology. A parent company might be able 
to rely on its technical superiority and other areas of competence as a 
means of guaranteeing participation in the management of joint 
venture operations (Glaister, 1995). Killing (1983) considers 
technology as a vital resource, finding that most firms with valuable 
technology would not enter joint ventures in which they own less than 
50 percent of the equity, and demand a managerial role. Harrigan 
(1986) argues that market access is the most attractive resource to 
control because it provides a competitive advantage that is more 
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durable than most technological resources, especially where product 
and process technology changes rapidly.  
4.1.3 Non-contractual resources  
With the globalisation in general and the development of joint 
ventures in particular, non-contractual resources have assumed 
increasing importance as a key to success, which lies in the 
knowledge and skill of managing complex interdependencies within 
and across joint venture boundaries and in the ability to manage 
multicultural units (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). The provision of 
non-contractual resourcing normally reflects the level of commitment 
by the owning companies to their joint venture (Beamish, 1988). They 
therefore represent a basis for a more ongoing relationship between 
the partner companies and the joint venture. A partner's possession of 
'soft technologies', advanced management systems, training and HRM 
expertise, and strong organisational cultures provides a further basis 
for exercising control, through the shaping of employees' activities 
and values. Trust placed in one partner by another, and/or by joint 
venture staff, may also lead them to accept control by the partner. Yan 
(2000) indicates that these resources are likely to give rise to effective 
ownership rights, through claims to expertise and also through the 
goodwill and cultural capital they generate, since the partner that is 
able to accumulate goodwill, trust and the loyalty of joint venture 
personnel adds significant value to its original equity. 
4.1.4 Summary 
In summary, equity share, especially a majority share, confers certain 
legal rights to determine the overall direction of a joint venture. When 
non-capital resources are provided through contracts, these can 
specify rights as to the use and possibly the management of such 
resources. When resources are provided on a non-contractual basis, 
they may still confer powers to the providing company, because 
intrinsically they create a dependency on its expertise and they 
generate the moral authority that derives from the way they evidence 
commitment. The distinction between these categories is likely to be a 
significant one for the understanding of the joint venture control, 
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because of the different nature and scope of the power that stems from 
each of them. 
4.2 Control mechanisms 
The mechanisms of control are those formal and informal 
organisational processes through which control over a joint venture is 
exercised by one or more of its parent companies as a means to 
achieve their respective objectives. As the joint venture is a 
cooperative organisation, the ability of an owner to exercise control 
involves the power and influence not only over its joint venture 
managers, but also over its partners (Yan, 2000).  
 
Friedman (1971) suggests that control is not a strict and automatic 
consequence of ownership, but a variety of mechanisms that are 
available to firms for exercising effective control. Control can be 
exercised by legal forms or influenced through the wide range of 
resources. As many scholars have indicated (Friedman, 1971, Killing, 
1983, Harrigan, 1986, Schaan, 1983), there are more or less similar 
types of control mechanisms, for instance ownership shares, 
representation on the joint venture board, appointment of key 
personnel, staffing, and particular contracts that are related to either 
technology or management. Other mechanisms used to control the 
venture work through the design of the venture's organisation 
structure and management systems. In addition, there are designated 
management instruments including performance measures, reporting 
systems, review procedures, reward systems, and so on (Hoon-
Halbauer, 1994). Organisational culture can be used as an indirect 
control mechanism for joint ventures, as it encourages employees to 
share the values and behavioural norms advanced by one or more of 
the owning companies. Such control relies on informal 
communication, extensive training, socialisation and frequent personal 
visits between parent companies and the joint ventures (Milliman 
1991).  
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Schaan (1983) identifies two broad forms of control. Positive controls 
are mechanisms for parent companies to encourage certain joint 
venture behaviour. Negative control mechanisms tend to be imposed 
by parent companies to stop or to prevent the joint venture from 
implementing certain activities or decisions. According to him, the 
positive control is most often exercised through informal mechanisms 
such as staffing, participation in the planning process and reporting 
relationships. Negative control relies mainly on formal procedures, 
approval by parent companies and the use of the joint venture board of 
directors. Positive control appears to be an ongoing process of 
influence, whereas negative control is more an exercise of raw power, 
which should not have to be employed if positive control mechanisms 
are in place and used properly (Killing, 1983). 
4.2.1 Formal agreements 
There are a variety of legal documents which invariably accompany 
the creation of a joint venture. These are nearly always closely 
connected to the issue of control. The articles of incorporation, by-
laws and shareholders' agreements, which are in a legal sense the 
cornerstone of any venture, clarify things such as the scope of the 
venture, the composition of the board, the type of decisions which 
need to come to the board for approval, and the percentage of votes 
needed to approve various types of decision. These documents deal 
directly with control in its most direct form: who can veto what? 
(Killing, 1983) In addition to these basic agreements between the 
partners, there is also a series of agreements between the joint venture 
and their parents in many areas, e.g. the supply of components, the 
product distribution and marketing channels, the supply of product 
design and production process, and etc. (Nightingale, 1990). As 
Killing (1983) points out, each of these agreements confers some 
degree of control to the partners, and the more the parent is involved 
in such agreement, the greater its influence (e.g. a marketing 
agreement will obviously give control over export volumes and 
involve the parent in discussions of pricing, advertising, distribution 
and product features). 
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The formal agreements provide ways of maintaining the stability of 
the joint venture, and provide the owners a guide for assessing 
whether the venture has deviated from their purpose in an 
unacceptable way (Harrigan, 1986). However, negotiating and setting 
up a clear legal document is a major task, and managing a venture 
which has many such agreements is very difficult, because a change in 
the venture's operation will have an impact on many of these areas 
(Killing, 1983). As Harrigan (1986) points out, the actual stability of 
cooperation between partners will be established by their subsequent 
behaviour patterns, not by what is written in their agreement. 
Alliances fail because operating managers do not make them work, 
not because contracts are poorly written. Therefore, joint venture 
agreements are of limited value because if partners need to use legal 
agreements to resolve issues and conflicts as they arise, then the joint 
venture is not likely to survive the rest of time (Triantis, 1999).  
4.2.2 Board of directors 
The board of directors represents an important source of control 
(Lorange & Roos, 1993). The main responsibilities for the joint 
venture's board of directors are to provide the venture linkage to the 
owners and at the same time create the mission, vision, and the 
strategy of the venture (Triantis, 1999). It is made up of 
representatives from each parent company and occasionally one or 
two outsiders recognised for their contributions in bringing the firms 
together (Ibid.). Obviously, the attitude, behaviour, and decision 
making of these representatives are presumed to achieve certain 
strategic intents and objectives of their own parents, which therefore 
provides the owners with a unique opportunity to guide the activities 
of their venture (Harrigan, 1986). However, as Killing (1983) points 
out, it is also here that differences in priorities, directions and perhaps 
values will emerge. If a parent who has a majority position on the 
board always forces issues by taking them to a vote, instead of by 
goodwill and cooperation, it will lose its joint venture. 
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4.2.3 Staffing  
Staffing has been recognised by many researchers (Harrigan, 1986, 
Killing, 1983, Schaan, 1983) as an important control mechanism 
influenced by the parent companies. According to their studies, the 
parent company tends to use its own personnel in the venture 
especially occupying the key positions such as the general manager 
and function manager. The stronger the people they can assign, the 
better from a control viewpoint (Lorange & Roos, 1993). There are 
several immediate advantages, as Killing (1983) points out, 
communications between the venture and the parent company are 
likely to be improved. More complete information offers the prospect 
of more complete control. Secondly, such an employee is likely to act 
in ways that his parent would find acceptable, even when his actions 
are not being overtly controlled. His values and attitudes will most 
probably have been shaped by the parent company and his loyalty and 
faithfulness towards his parent will guide him even in the joint 
venture. However, staffing is also one of the characteristics that 
differentiates joint ventures from other forms of organisation and 
therefore may cause the problems such as the "mistrust", or 
"allegiance". This aspect will be discussed in chapter 4.6. 
4.2.4 Cost of control 
Control incurs costs, both direct and indirect. In addition to the direct 
administrative costs that any control mechanism causes, indirect costs 
arise from the detrimental effects that inappropriate control can have 
on motivation and the ability of a venture to behave flexibly. Over-
control by parent companies may inhibit the flexibility and autonomy 
that their joint venture needs in order to develop within its own 
competitive environment (Harrigan, 1986). A power-based attitude 
towards control does not induce a cooperative spirit, which conversely 
may damage the trust among the partners and between the partner and 
the venture (Lorange and Roos, 1993). A good management control 
system relies on the good relationships among the partners and their 
willingness to cooperate and solve any conflicts.  
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4.3 Ownership structure design 
Ownership structure is a means to realise partners’ objectives through 
the performance of their venture. Therefore, the range of the resources 
provided and the level of control generated through those resources 
are influenced by the partner's objectives and also have an impact on 
the venture's performance. There are many theories about the 
relationships among the objectives and the ownership and control and 
their impacts on the joint venture performance. Researcher Yan 
(2000) summarises these theories and concludes three models 
according to these theories.  
4.3.1 A formation model 
A formation model is concerned with the link between objectives and 
ownership (see Figure 4.1). It explores that, at a joint venture 
formation, the strategic and financial objectives of the investing 
companies are reflected in the preferred equity level and range of 
ownership resourcing that they have committed to the joint venture. It 
is recognised that a wide variety of objectives are likely to be present 
at joint venture formation and be translated into the relative ownership 
configuration (Yan, 2000). Firms' strategic mission will determine 
how they will use their resources and competence and to what extent 
they will assume control while at the same time have to give up some 
control (Harrigan, 1986). On the other hand, the structure of the 
ownership resources also reflects the relative bargaining position of 
the partners (Harrigan, 1986). 
 
 
 Objective                         Ownership          Control 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Formation model (Yan, 2000) 
 
A joint venture is normally formed between a foreign partner with 
specific technology and a local partner with the local knowledge, 
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distribution ties, marketing access, management expertise and so on 
(Killing, 1983, Harrigan, 1986, Hyder, 1988). Many firms with 
valuable technology will only supply it to a joint venture in which 
they own more than 50 percent and/or have a significant voice in its 
management (Killing, 1983). As a result of the negotiation, the local 
partner who is urgent to find this technology to create value for their 
own companies may have to accept a minority position at least in the 
equity shares but at the same time achieve more effective control on 
operational levels. Contractor (1989) suggests that the use of limited 
investment is needed to absorb the high costs of marketing, for 
enforcing patents and contracts and for achieving economies of scale. 
Therefore, a firm with these objectives will tend to favour a lower-
scale investment, and minority equity shares may be more efficient. 
4.3.2 A universalistic model 
A universalistic model is relevant to the links between ownership 
resourcing, control and performance (see Figure 4.2). It regards the 
level and range of ownership resourcing brought by each investing 
company to the partnership as enabling them to exercise the control 
they desire. The range of ownership resourcing influences the joint 
venture's control over strategic and operational levels. Control is a 
function of equity capital, ownership non-capital resources and 
ownership non-contractual resources. Equity structure is not 
equivalent to management control, but it delineates the relative 
positions of the partners and sets a tone for the successive negotiations 
over management structure and control (Harrigan, 1986).  
 
With regards to the impact of ownership resources on joint venture 
performance, some researchers conclude that dominant parent joint 
ventures are more likely to be successful compared to shared 
management ventures (Killing, 1983, Buckley and Casson, 1988). 
Killing (1983) groups the ventures under the pattern of control 
exercised. In a dominant parent joint venture one of the partners plays 
an active managerial role, and the venture is managed as if it is a 
wholly owned subsidiary. In this case, the board of directors is just a 
formality and all the functional managers are appointed by and report 
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to that active parent. In a shared management venture both parents 
play a meaningful managerial role and all significant decisions are 
shared. In an independent venture neither parent plays an important 
role. The general manager of the venture enjoys a great level of 
operating autonomy. The point here is that a firm can dominate a 
venture without having a dominant ownership position, and similarly, 
a venture does not need to be equally owned by its parents to have 
shared management. According to his study, independent joint 
ventures outperform dominant parent and shared management joint 
ventures, whereas a comparison of dominant and shared management 
joint ventures suggests that the former stand a better chance of 
success. Buckley and Casson (1988) note that dominant control is a 
mechanism for reducing the risks associated with coordination, 
potential conflicts and disclosures. Consequently it can minimise 
transaction costs and stabilise the venture. This argument appears to 
support Killing's (1983) view that shared control constitutes the major 
source of management difficulties in joint ventures, while dominant 
parent joint ventures are easier to manage and consequently have 
more chance of success.  
 
 
Objective  Ownership  Control 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Universalistic model (Yan, 2000) 
 
In contrast to Killing's study, Beamish (1988) finds that shared rather 
than dominant control would bring a joint venture success. Janger 
(1980) reports that neither a dominant parent nor a shared 
management venture shows superior performance. It is not surprising 
that they have different answers, since success of joint venture lies in, 
PERFORMANCE 
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among other things how well the joint venture is managed afterward 
and the continuity of their willingness that the partners would like to 
cooperate from the beginning. In addition, the performance achieved 
by the venture seems to vary over time, Lee and Beamish (1995) 
argue that the partner's contributions are the most important factor to 
guarantee high-performance. Harrigan (1987) finds that a joint venture 
of longer standing tends to achieve a more successful performance.  
4.3.3 A contingency model 
A contingency model (see Figure 4.3) is concerned with the match 
among objectives, ownership and control, and the implications of this 
match for joint venture performance. In particular, it argues that it is 
the goodness of fit between the distinctive resources brought by 
partners and the control leveraged from those resources and 
competencies that determines the level of performance of the joint 
venture. The more consistent the configuration of parent ownership 
and control, the better the performance of the joint venture (Yan, 
2000).  
 
                                                Fit 
Objectives                   Ownership 
 
 
 
                         Fit                                         Fit 
 
                                           Control 
 
Figure 4.3 Contingency model (Yan, 2000) 
 
Schaan (1983) states that joint venture success, or the extent to which 
parent expectations for the joint venture are met, is a function of the 
Performance 
 41 
fit with three variables: the parent's criteria for success, the activities 
or decisions it controls and the control mechanisms that are utilised. 
He concludes that joint ventures in which a parent achieves this fit 
will show better performance. Janger (1980) suggests that joint 
venture success should be enhanced when the joint venture's structure 
fits the owning company's strategy.  
 
The performance of a joint venture will be satisfactory to the partners 
only if the contributions of the partners, and the expected benefits to 
them, are kept in balance. The joint venture relationships cannot be a 
zero-sum game where what one partner gains, the other loses, but 
rather one in which there are solutions benefiting both partners 
(Triantis, 1999). In a joint venture neither partner is passive, each 
partner contributes and must expect to gain from the partnership 
(Harrigan, 1986). The performance of a joint venture was dependent, 
to a certain degree, on the balance of the benefits the partners achieve 
from the performance (Robinson, 1969). If the joint venture is in a 
win-lose situation, then the likelihood of low performance is high. 
4.3.4 Subject to difficulties and changes 
The models give a deep insight to the study of joint ventures, 
especially the contingency model which identifies the fits among 
objectives, ownership and control and the balance between the 
partners contribution and expectations. It is wise to divide the 
management responsibility for the major functional areas in a joint 
venture according to abilities and contributions and not on the basis of 
shareholding (Bivens and Lovell, 1966). However, it is not always 
easy to determine and evaluate the relative contributions of the 
partners. Some assets are visible and measurable such as the financial 
investments and even the technological contribution while other 
assets, such as a specialised type of management ability, local 
business ties, and knowledge of local conditions, are very ill defined 
(Ibid.). Berg and Friedman (1980) argue that dissimilar expectation 
about the contributions and gains would lead to trouble for a joint 
venture. They maintain that additional contributions would be 
necessary to run the venture, when the contributions were unequal. 
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Hyder (1988) points out that a joint venture is not a one-time thing; it 
is concerned with dynamic consequence. Both resources and partners' 
desire concerning the allocation of those resources may change. 
Killing (1983) considers the change in the need for resources from one 
another due to the presence of continuous learning. He argues that this 
change would eventually make the partners less important to each 
other, as their needs decreased. Harrigan (1986) observes the 
divergence of business interests among the partners over time. It is 
fine to start the joint venture with technical know-how but if the 
market changes or competitive strengths develop, the partners will 
constantly reassess the other partners ongoing contribution.  
 
Joint venture is a kind of long-term contract among the partners. Like 
all contracts it is subject to many difficulties. As circumstances 
change in the future, the contract may be too inflexible to permit the 
required adjustment to be made. The change may be the result of both 
internal and external factors. To achieve the fitness in all dimensions, 
not only requires the knowledge, the skills and the willingness of the 
partners to cooperate, but also needs the partners' perception and a 
positive attitude towards the potential changes so as to adapt to the 
dynamic changing needs. In next section, we will further describe the 
details of these changes that may occur based on Harrigan's 
bargaining power theory (1986). 
4.4 Changing forces 
Harrigan (1986) sees the form of a joint venture as a bargaining power 
between the owners. This bargaining power arises out of the relative 
urgency (strategic needs), the resources available and other 
commitments, possible alternatives, and similar strengths and 
weaknesses of each owner. The bargaining agreement, which sets 
forth the venture's objectives, scope, degree of freedom, and 
constrains, represents the compromise that has been established by the 
partners on the basis of their willingness to cooperate and their 
relative bargaining position. The agreement also specifies the input 
provided by the owner, the output produced by the venture and 
possibly its customer as well, and the control mechanisms used by the 
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owners to ensure their respective interest. It provides owners with a 
guide for assessing whether the venture has deviated from their 
purpose in an unacceptable way.  
 
However, the needs and strengths of each partner's major business 
activities are subject to continual changes, and these changes often 
enhance or diminish that partner's interest in the joint venture's 
activities. The venture also faces dynamic competitive forces in its 
environment, which will affect the venture's ability to satisfy the 
desires of its owners. As a result of the many forces, the original terms 
of the bargaining agreement become less satisfactory for at least one 
party and it may be necessary to renegotiate the original agreement or 
an end to the joint venture (See Figure 4.4).  
4.4.1 Owner change forces 
The timing of changes surround either owner. Changes in owners' 
strategic mission, changes in importance of the joint venture to 
owners, and changes in owners' bargaining power with respect to its 
partners will influence how the venture is going to be. 
 
Changes in owners' strategy and venture's strategic importance 
When the joint venture is formed, each owner receives benefit from 
the venture that aids the owner's respective strategic missions. 
However their missions may change due to the environmental 
changes, competitive pressures, or other demands, which accordingly 
may make the venture's activities more or less important to their new 
strategic missions. As Harrigan (1986) argues, it is important to 
recognise when the terms of a joint venture should be changed and 
when the venture should be terminated. If the venture no longer fits 
well with its owner's original plans, if the owners cannot agree upon 
important points of cooperation, if firms diverge from their original 
vision for the venture, or if their strategies evolve in a manner that 
lessens the venture's usefulness, it might be necessary to negotiate a 
"fade out" for one of the owners.  
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Figure 4.4 A dynamic model of joint venture activity (Based on 
Harrigan, 1986) 
External Owner A 
Bargaining 
power 
Strategic needs 
Initial strengths 
Resources 
Owner B 
Bargaining 
power 
Strategic needs 
Initial strengths 
Resources 
Joint venture    
Bargaining agreement 
Inputs provided by owners 
Venture's outputs sold to 
owners (or outsiders) 
Control mechanisms 
Change forces 
Owner change forces 
Change in owner's  
strategic missions 
Changes in 
importance of the 
venture to owners 
Changes in other 
forces that determine 
bargaining power  
Owner-venture 
change forces 
Changes in venture's 
need for decision-
making autonomy 
Changes in owners' 
needs for control and 
coordination with 
venture 
Venture change 
forces 
Changes in 
industry  success 
requirements 
Changes in 
competitor's 
strategies 
Reconfiguration of the joint venture 
(Could redefine linkages, change jventure's organisation form, 
increase/decrease venture's scope and mission, or end venture) 
Change
Eventual performance and disposition of the joint venture 
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Changes in owners' relative bargaining power   
Harrigan (1986) describes the relationship among the owners of a 
venture as a bargaining power. This bargaining power is based on the 
fit or interplay between the resources and needs of the owners. Each 
partner gives and takes and is continually reassessing the trade-offs of 
its investment. However, if the resources that one partner contributes 
to the joint venture become more or less valuable than those 
contributed by other partners, or if one of the partners believes that it 
has made a one-sided bargain that unreasonably favours the other 
partner, the balance of relative bargaining power among partners will 
shift, and their original cooperative relationship will be struck. 
Harrigan (1986) concludes that joint ventures are more frequently 
terminated as the value of each partner's resources evolves 
asymmetrically and partners are unwilling (or unable) to work out a 
new agreement that is mutually satisfactory. Lorange and Roos (1993) 
consider it as a natural and pragmatic evolution that the partner who 
provides, e.g. the marketing input becomes increasingly dominant in 
the role of executing the joint venture activities, while the other 
partner who is providing the technology may become less and less 
active after the initial technological learning has been completed and 
the know-how transferred. They argue that partners without this 
perception will be in trouble and their ongoing relationship will face 
difficulties.  
4.4.2 Owner-venture change forces 
There are also changes in owner-venture relationships. The venture 
may need more decision-making autonomy; the owner may need more 
coordination with or control over its venture's activity. Harrigan 
(1986) emphasises that the tensions between the venture's need for 
operating autonomy and the owners' need for parent control must be 
identified, particularly as these opposing pressures will affect owners' 
abilities to satisfy the strategy needs of their venture. Harrigan argues 
that an appropriate mix of autonomy from and coordination with its 
owners' activities will depend on the venture's strategic mission and 
how its activities will be integrated with its owners. According to her, 
owners' need to intervene in the joint venture's decisions increases (1) 
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as the venture's strategic importance to the owner increases; (2) as the 
value and scope of resources that the venture shared with the owner 
increase; (3) as the degree of resource transfers between the owner 
and venture increases. The venture's need for autonomy increases as 
the speed of the competitive response needed increases, but will 
decrease as similarities between owners' and venture's strategic 
missions increase or as the value and scope of resources shared among 
them increase. 
 
By way of summarising Harrigan's reasoning on trade-off between 
autonomy and coordination, Figure 4.5 shows that an uneasy 
relationship is the outcome of a high degree of owners' need to control 
and coordinate venture's activities as opposed to a high degree of 
venture's need for autonomy. 
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Figure 4.5 Owner coordination and venture autonomy needs 
(Harrigan, 1986) 
 
Managing this trade-off is easier said than done. Sustaining good 
relationships between the partners is an important factor to coordinate 
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owner-venture relationships. As Harrigan (1986) points out, without 
this chemistry owners will not realise the full benefits of their venture 
and synergies will not accrue between them. If differences in strength, 
performance, commitment, and other factors lead owners to use 
negative control mechanisms that prevent their partners from enjoying 
desired synergies, their participation in the venture will not continue 
(Ibid.).  
4.4.3 Venture change forces 
The changes also surround the venture itself. The venture faces 
volatile competitive conditions and risks in its target market. If its 
industry structure and success requirements change, the venture's 
strategy may no longer be suitable for serving its customers, or the 
venture may be less effective in implementing its chosen strategy 
(Harrigan, 1986). It may be terminated if it does not function well 
enough to document competitive success in its business area or yield 
the necessary return to its parents (Lorange and Roos, 1993), or it may 
be reconstituted or changed in response to threats and opportunities of 
its industry (Harrigan, 1986). The more volatile the competition and 
the more uncertain the environment surrounding the joint venture, the 
more decision making autonomy the venture needs to be able to 
respond quickly and smoothly to the changes (Kumar and Seth, 1998). 
The change is inevitable, as Harrigan (1986) explains, because few 
industry structures are likely to remain unchanged in the future and 
few ongoing relationships between owner and venture or between 
partners are likely to match competitive realities for long.  
4.4.4 Summary 
Joint venture is inherently unstable since many factors have been 
identified as causes of the potential changes of the original conditions 
in the agreements. These factors include changes in partners' strategic 
mission, changes in importance of the venture to the partners, changes 
in the trade-off between parents' need for control and venture's need 
for autonomy, and changes in the venture's competitive environment. 
All these changes could precipitate renegotiations of the terms of the 
bargaining agreement. If partners can no longer cooperate by 
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renegotiating on the points of their agreements, the venture may be 
liquidated, spunoff, taken over by one partner, or sold to an outside 
firm. However, the termination of the venture or the power shift 
between partners does not necessarily mean the failure of the joint 
venture. Many firms view the joint ventures as intentionally 
temporary and recognise that their ventures will not last indefinitely. 
As Inkpen and Beamish (1997) conclude, if a joint venture 
termination is an orderly and mutually planned event, the joint venture 
may well be evaluated as extremely successful. In fact, a joint venture 
that is prematurely terminated also may be evaluated as successful, 
depending on the criteria used to evaluate its performance.  
4.5 Vertical relationships 
Vertical (buyer-seller) relationships that once may have existed 
between owner and venture may be terminated later as they become 
uneconomic (Harrigan, 1986). Careful management is needed in order 
for the benefits of vertical synergies to offset the dangers created by 
strategic inflexibility. 
4.5.1 Strategic inflexibility 
Harrigan's (1986) opinion is that though they offer synergies, 
vertically related ventures pose unique problems if the joint venture is 
restricted from dealing with outsiders. If a partner is not willing to 
eventually let the venture establish its own market contacts, the life 
cycle of the venture is likely to be aborted (Lorange and Roos, 1993). 
Such ventures are more likely to make products that the market does 
not want and its owners are more likely to be subsequently locked into 
purchases that are out of fashion with what end users desire. Therefore 
overreliance by the venture on its owners as customers can injure 
sponsoring firms' strategic flexibility as well as their venture's 
longevity (Harrigan, 1986). Conflicts may occur if either party 
(owners, venture or other partners) wants to change this supplier-
buyer relationship while others may be content with their old 
allocations of the venture's output (Ibid.).  
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4.5.2 Jealousy 
Another particular problem, according to Harrigan (1986), is that 
cooperative memories are short in supplier-buyer relationships 
especially when they know each other's costs. Partners that believe 
they are on the short end of a joint venture, or perceive that other 
partners' profit margins are too wide, or believe that other perceived 
inequities exist, will want to renegotiate their agreements even if the 
venture is making a fortune for them. Harrigan (Ibid.) concludes that 
with at least three separate enterprises involved (two owners and their 
venture) there naturally will be some jockeying for priorities, 
protecting of turf, and jealousies at the success of the other parties.  
 
When several partners have buyer-supplier relationships with their 
venture, it is important that all partners be treated equitably, and the 
venture's future viability be protected in managing those synergies 
(Harrigan, 1986). Transfer price may often be of most concern to the 
parties (Killing, 1983), which therefore should be designed to ensure 
that no party benefits to the detriment of the others (Harrigan, 1986). 
Ventures need autonomy to purchase inputs from outside suppliers or 
to sell to outside customers when they are willing to offer better prices 
than their owners. When ventures are only development-and-
manufacturing companies for their owners, it is more difficult to 
determine whether their outputs are cost-competitive with those of 
outsiders (since owners are their only customers). From the point of 
view that joint venture is a third independent entity with its own 
vision, mission and strategy, vertical relationship is not good for 
venture's own development and full evolution in the long run 
(Lorange and Roos, 1993).  
4.6 Managing ambiguous relationships 
The collaborations in joint ventures are plagued by ambiguities in 
relationships (see Figure 4.6). Joint venture partners are independent 
firms with their own agendas. Often they are rivals to boot. They enter 
into a venture with different motives, and one can never be entirely 
certain of another's true incentives for collaborating. They may have 
divergent objectives for and demands from the venture, which will 
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influence the way they cooperate, control, manage, and evaluate the 
venture. Harrigan (1986) sees it as a bargaining power embodied in 
the cooperative agreement prior to the formation of a joint venture, 
though this bargaining power will be changing all the time. The 
relationship between the parents and the venture embodies the issues 
of parental control and the venture's need for operating autonomy. The 
ambiguous nature of venture relationships is further complicated by 
the fact that different managers within the venture may bring different 
value, expectations and commitments to their tasks. For example, the 
joint venture general managers (JVGMs) often face a great deal of 
ambiguity in terms of meeting both parents' minds and assuring the 
viability of the venture. The staffing of the venture on the one hand 
promotes the information transfer between the venture and the 
parents. On the other hand the assumed loyalty of these managers to 
their respective parents may damage the benefit of the venture or other 
partners and create the mistrust problem throughout the venture.  
 
According to Killing (1983), the relationships that prevail within a 
dominant parent joint venture are not as complicated as those that 
exist in a shared management joint venture, mainly because the 
functional staff principally come from one single parent. The basic 
reason why problems emerge in a shared management joint venture is 
that parents have different objectives, which becomes the more 
apparent the more joint decision-making is called for in the venture, 
leading to “mistrust” between parents. 
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Figure 4.6 Prevalent relationships within a joint venture  
(Hoon-Halbauer, 1994) 
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4.6.1 Mistrust 
Killing (1983) argues that the mistrust problem is manifested at the 
board and operational staff level. In a joint venture where the general 
manager has to refer many decisions to a board, whose members have 
different objectives, priorities and values, decision-making is likely to 
slow down, making it more difficult for the general manager to 
manage the joint venture. There could also be a collaboration problem 
between the two groups of staff due to the problem of mistrust 
between the two partners (Killing, 1983).  
 
A consequence of mistrust is that many joint ventures have both 
general and functional managers drawn from their parents; some use 
two general managers, one taken from each parent; several hire an 
outsider as general manager, but have functional managers from the 
parents. Not surprisingly, the working relationship between two 
managers in this situation tends to be strained, cumbersome and 
inefficient. Another consequence of the problem of mistrust is that it 
is hard to establish a well working team at the operational level, 
especially at the functional management level since a venture is 
formed in order to utilise both partner's skills and resources. Two 
additional factors that aggravate the collaboration problem between 
the two groups of staff are different working styles and 
professionality, together with different values, attitudes and beliefs. 
(Killing, 1983)  
4.6.2 Allegiance 
Another important challenge in managing the staff is the issue of what 
Killing (1983) terms allegiance. We describe this issue mainly from 
the JVGMs' perspective, since JVGMs are the linkages of many 
relationships, and they are always exposed to the centre of the 
problems. 
 
The lack of clarity which typically surrounds a joint venture's 
objectives and the fact that there is often a degree of conflict between 
the objectives of the venture's parents mean that the allegiance of the 
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venture's general manager plays an important role in determining how 
the venture is run. A problem that can occur in a joint venture is what 
role the general manager plays. In a joint venture the general manager 
has to play a different role from that of a general manager in a wholly 
owned subsidiary: he must accommodate the interests of two parents, 
each with different expectations; and he has to face an ambiguity in 
terms of defining both parent’s criteria of success and must deal with 
commitment and communication between the two parents (Beamish, 
1988).  
 
Managing a joint venture so as to meet two or more sets of 
expectations is a difficult task. It is also unreasonable for a JVGM to 
meet simultaneously all criteria for one parent, let alone for others. If 
he tries to do so or is perceived as trying to do so, sooner or later he 
will erode his credibility and jeopardise his working relationship with 
the partner who feels discriminated. Beamish (1988) argues that 
JVGMs should see their allegiance to the venture first and to the 
parents second especially when the parents come to a situation where 
one is perceived to win and the other to lose. As killing (1983) 
indicates, a successful JVGM has to have a very high tolerance for 
ambiguity, excellent negotiating skills and a good feel for what 
matters to each parent, because he may not be told explicitly. 
According to Shaan 's (1983) study, most venture managers' first goal 
is to avoid conflict and tension between their parents, only secondly 
do they try to achieve specific performance goals.  
 
The relationship between the JVGM and the functional managers is 
also ambiguous (Killing, 1983), since these functional managers are in 
most cases provided by the parent companies. They very often 
considers their loyalty to their parents more than to the JVGM if they 
believe their rewards, punishments or promotions are not controlled 
by the JVGM but by their parents. The issue can become particularly 
intense, as Killing describes, if the general manager is proposing 
actions which the functional manager feels not in his parent's best 
interest.  
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A joint venture will not last long and partners' desired synergies will 
not be realised if the managers/employees in the venture always block 
their ideas by misplaced loyalty to the respective parents. Therefore, it 
is important to understand that a means must be provided to sustain a 
good relationship between the partners as well as a climate of mutual 
respect and trust throughout the organisation. 
4.6.3 Trust  
Chemistry and organisational trust 
Establishing the right atmosphere is the most important task in joint 
venture management, as Yoshino (1999) points out, unless the 
managers have the right chemistry with their counterparts in the 
partner firm, the venture will not go anywhere. The "right chemistry" 
is defined as organisational trust, that is, trust within a firm and trust 
between a firm and its partner. Yoshino sees the ambiguity as an 
inherent relationship existing in the venture. It is not surprising that 
every alliance is plagued by strong suspicions right from the start. 
However, in the absence of trust, venture partner's expectations are 
likely to go unfulfilled, exacerbating suspicion and disappointment 
and leading to a vicious cycle.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7 Route to organisational trust (Based on Yoshino, 
1999) 
The author provides three ways to establish organisational trust (see 
Figure 4.7). One way is to build direct, mostly one-to-one personal 
relationships, since close personal ties with the partners and among 
the managers can promote prompt information transfer, lead to open 
communications, solve difficult conflicts, and avert potential disasters. 
Another route to interorganisational trust is through familiarity with a 
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strategy,organisation,culture 
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partner's strategy, organisation, and culture, since once differences are 
understood and accepted for what they are, barriers come down. 
Furthermore, the author argues that a tangible result of mutually 
beneficial accomplishments, the earlier the better, can also foster 
organisational trust.  
 
Trust, communication and commitment 
Schann and Beamish (1988) have the same opinion that trust between 
partners is a critical ingredient in the successful resolution of 
conflicts. They argue that JVGMs need to help the parents build a 
relationship where trust is an important component. They suggest 
JVGMs to avoid situations that may jeopardise trust because once lost 
it is extremely hard to rebuild.  
 
As for how to build trust, they advocate that an open communication 
system is important. By developing and maintaining an open 
communication system with the joint venture and with the partner, the 
parent is able to (1) better understand the joint venture's problems and 
offer better solutions; (2) become aware of changes occurring in the 
joint venture business or in its partner's expectations; and (3) keep in 
touch with its partner, hence showing commitment to the joint venture 
and contributing to a trust relationship. In fact, as the authors further 
supplement, the trust-communication-commitment characteristics are 
truly integrated. Making efforts to either factor can have a positive 
effect on another (see Figure 4.8). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8 Trust, communication, and commitment (Based on 
Schann and Beamish, 1988) 
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Communication Commitment 
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Trust, autonomy and success 
Killing (1983) argues that trust is more likely to be the cause of joint 
venture success than its result. He finds a link between the autonomy 
of a general manger and the level of trust between the parents, and 
identifies a failure cycle (see Figure 4.9) of joint ventures, in which 
autonomy and trust play an important role.  
 
Killing sees the issue of autonomy as related to the level of trust on 
the parents. One example is the case where parents express their lack 
of trust and start to interfere in the affairs of the venture as soon as 
there is a slight deterioration in the venture's performance. The lack of 
trust may be directed towards the general manager whom the parents 
probably consider incompetent to achieve the desired performance of 
the venture. When the parents start to act accordingly, the failure cycle 
of the joint venture will inevitably be set in motion, since the potential 
for fighting and confusion and political intrigue increases enormously 
when two parents are involved. The more they interfere, the more 
confusion will result, and the slower the decision-making process will 
be. Consequently, performance suffers further, encouraging the 
parents to become even more closely involved, which causes the 
downward cycle to continue.  
 
Killing argues that this cycle may not return to equilibrium, with the 
end result that what was initially a minor decline in performance can 
trigger a series of events leading to a major crisis. Bearing this in 
mind, Killing suggests that the JVGM must establish a feeling of trust 
in the parents by way of early good performance. Only when he has 
secured the confidence of parents will he be given a high degree of 
autonomy in managing the venture, which leads to improved 
performance.  
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Figure 4.9 The failure cycle (Killing, 1983) 
 
4.6.4 Summary  
Managing a joint venture is a difficult task where ambiguous 
relationships exist. Problems of mistrust and allegiance are inherent, 
since the managers and staff are often provided by more than two 
partners who have different objectives, expectations and demands 
from the venture. JVGM's role is very special since he is central to the 
interaction of all parties. It is not wise to try and ensure that the 
general manager has a special allegiance to either partner, since by 
doing so one will only earn the mistrust of another and make the 
general manager's job more difficult. Trust is a key factor in solving 
the conflict and leading to joint venture success. Efforts should be 
made continuously to sustain a good relationship and build an 
atmosphere of chemistry and mutual trust. Parent companies should 
not jump heavily into affairs of a joint venture if it begins to perform 
poorly. If both parents do get more heavily involved in the venture's 
decision-making process it is likely to decrease, not increase the 
venture's prospects for survival. Giving a venture manager autonomy 
certainly does not guarantee success, but if both parents decide not to 
give him any freedom, chances of failure are greatly increased. 
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Chapter 5 Analysis and Discussion of the case 
5.1 Investigating the conflicts 
The conflicts that occurred in AN early this year contain three parts. 
One conflict about AN's1998 account had been going on for a long 
period of time and until it was finally presented in the beginning of 
2000 by the final deadline set by PRV, the two owners, TWR and 
VCC, still disagreed upon how to divide the loss. Another conflict 
came when VCC started to pay a lower price for the cars delivered 
from AN some time after the 1998 account has been presented. The 
third one is actually the ownership fight between the two partners, 
shortly before and after the production was stopped at AN on March 
7, 2000, that is, both VCC and TWR fought to buy out each other at 
what they thought the most reasonable price.  
 
It should be noted that these conflicts are interconnected with each 
other, however, the root cause is that VCC is a slightly minority 
owner and also the only customer of AN. This double role of VCC 
also makes it ambiguous and controversial as to which role VCC 
should play to solve the problems.  
 
AN produced cars upon the orders from its sole customer VCC, and 
the price of every delivered car was fixed in the agreement which 
would be renegotiated every October. From this point, whether AN is 
profitable or not largely depends on how many cars VCC needed and 
which price VCC as a buyer agreed to pay for the cars. That is the 
basic reason why AN's 1998 account showed a profit but at the same 
time had a controversial claim on VCC with the result of a big loss of 
310 MSEK which AN/TWR demanded be borne by the customer, 
VCC.  
 
During the first conflicts, VCC chose to behave as an owner, insisting 
that the 1998 loss should be divided between the partners according to 
proportion of shareholding. During the second conflict, VCC chose to 
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stand as a buyer, arguing that they did not lower the price but come 
back to the price which was originally agreed upon in the agreement. 
It is obvious that if VCC were not the sole customer, these two 
conflicts would not have occurred, at least not between VCC and 
TWR/AN but maybe to a third party.  
 
Thus the main problems come from the ownership structure, and their 
inability to effectively handle the conflicts push the ownership 
question to the extreme point that would be the only way to solve the 
tensions.  
5.2 The potential problems with the original ownership 
AN is a typical form of joint venture, with the foreign partner, TWR 
bringing specific technology, and the local partner, VCC contributing 
among other things the plant, local knowledge, distribution ties, 
marketing access and so on. In 1993, after an unsuccessful attempt to 
merge with France's Renault, VCC was urgent to find another partner 
to work with to ensure its long term strength and development, since 
they realised that due to their limited size in the auto industry they 
would be unable to accomplish objectives from internal development 
alone. Thus TWR was a good candidate at that time that could give 
VCC a racing image it its car. From VCC's perspective, the cars 
produced in AN would never be decisive for their financial future, but 
broaden its production line and attract more customers, which would 
strengthen VCC's competitive and strategic position in the market. 
From TWR's perspective, working with a company like VCC who has 
a good reputation in auto market is acceptable since it would earn 
moderate profit while letting the risk be someone else's.  
 
Thus the bargaining power arose between the TWR and VCC. 
Harrigan (1986) addresses that bargaining power arises out of relative 
urgency, available resources, possible alternatives, and similar 
strengths and weaknesses of each owner. Evaluating these factors 
could be a good answer for why the equity ownership was split by 51 
percent to TWR and 49 percent to VCC. It is a product of the relative 
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bargaining power and compromise between the two partners. Though 
there is just a slight difference, equity ownership is often viewed as a 
key dimension because it usually reflects the extent of strategic 
control over important decisions and sets a tone for the successive 
negotiations over the management structure and control. Already said 
in Chapter 3.3, most foreign partners with specific technology will not 
supply it to its partner unless they can have more than 50 percent 
control. This may be the case for TWR. As a compromise and its 
urgent need for cooperation, VCC had no choice but to seek more 
operational and effective control over AN.  
 
The universalistic model identifies that equity structure is not 
equivalent to management control; control is a function of equity 
capital, ownership contractual resources and ownership non-
contractual resources, and the range of ownership resourcing 
influences the joint venture's control over strategic and operational 
levels. Applied to our case, VCC's full control over the marketing 
would help VCC realise maximum effective control over the venture. 
Like Harrigan (1986) argues, market access is the most attractive 
resource to control because it provides a competitive advantage that is 
more durable than most technological resources, especially where 
product and process technology changes rapidly. More than the 
market access, VCC actually is the sole customer, which therefore 
would give it strong enough power to balance its slightly minority 
position in equity shares. Besides, VCC signed the contracts with all 
AN's suppliers, which on the one hand could allow AN to get 
advantages with VCC's discount, on the other hand enhanced AN's 
dependence on VCC and at the same time strengthened another 
dimension of VCC's effective control over the venture. 
 
The Contingency Model suggests that a fit among objectives, 
ownership, and control would lead to a joint venture success. 
However, we argue that it is difficult to define and know whether the 
three factors really fit each other at the joint venture formation 
especially when there are at least three parties (two partners and the 
venture) involved. This goodness of fit needs a long time to test and 
retest. In the case of AN, we can at least say that this venture's 
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structure with VCC as a minority owner but also a sole customer is 
potentially unstable, especially because this customer has the power to 
decide the price of the manufactured cars. Therefore the financial 
success of AN not only depends on its cost effectiveness, but also 
depends on how willingly VCC would support its venture as both 
owner and customer. It is said that the price was fixed in the supplier-
buyer agreement and the agreement would be renegotiated every 
October. Here a big uncertainty exists: How comprehensive, detailed 
and flexible was the original agreement? What accounting method did 
they use to fix the price? What if the fixed price turned out to be 
unreasonable? On what basis would the renegotiation process go on? 
What if the renegotiations failed? These questions now turn out to be 
true in AN and have already caused the conflicts, however, we argue 
that at the joint venture's beginning, all parties should have seen the 
potential problems with this ownership structure. If this was the 
necessary compromise and the only means for VCC and TWR to 
cooperate, more efforts and caution should have been put on the 
successive management and on building a good relationship between 
the owners and the owner-venture so as to provide a harmonious 
climate to solve the problems if they occurred. The actual stability of 
cooperation between partners will be established by their subsequent 
behaviour patterns, not by what is written in their agreement. 
 
A tight control over AN is needed for VCC. Harrigan (1986) proposes 
a trade off between the venture's need for autonomy and owner's need 
for coordination and control. If both needs are high, the venture will 
be very unstable. However, if the venture is of strategic importance to 
the owner, and the sharing and transfers of the input and output 
between them are high, the owner will feel a particularly urgent need 
to assert its control over the operations of the venture. AN was of 
course of strategic importance to VCC, which we have already 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, therefore it is unlikely that VCC 
would give AN more operating autonomy especially when there were 
such buyer-supplier relationships. The 'trade-off' would only be 
reached and sustained if AN's need for autonomy was low and would 
not increase and the other owner TWR would not interfere too much. 
However, it is a big uncertainty. Building and sustaining good 
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relationships among all the parties is an important factor in managing 
that uncertainty to avoid the potential conflicts. 
 
Harrigan (1986) mentions that once vertical (supplier-buyer) 
relationship exists, it may be terminated later since it becomes 
uneconomic. Her opinion is that vertical relationship between the 
owner and the venture could impede the venture's healthy evolution to 
a stand-alone entity, damage the strategic flexibility of either firm, and 
cause the tension between venture's need for autonomy and parent’s 
need for control to be even worse if one of them wants to change this 
relationship. It can also make another partner uncomfortable if that 
partner finds his counterpart benefits more from this vertical 
connection. This has been proven in our case. When VCC demanded 
that 1998 account loss be divided between the owners, as a customer 
it actually profited a lot from AN though how big this profit margin 
was is unknown, but at least VCC would not sell those cars to its end-
customer below the price it bought from AN. That is for sure! Our 
mission is not to find out who should be responsible for the loss, 
which was so complex a question that it confused the auditors as well 
and already turned to the arbitration. Our concern is that if a vertical 
relationship exists between the owner and the venture, it should be 
carefully managed to ensure a win-win position among all parties. 
Maybe the best way is to think from the other side and always 
remember the venture is to bring benefits for all partners, which is the 
basic motivation for them to cooperate in the beginning. Partners, like 
human beings, are naturally jealous of each other especially when one 
feels unbalanced with the give-and-take. If a vertical relationship 
creates a win-lose position between the owners or between the owner 
and the venture, as happened in AN, this relationship will be in great 
danger and the venture will not last long.  
 
So far, we have analysed the potential problems within the original 
ownership structure of AN. It is important that these potential 
problems should be perceived by the partners, and a good relationship 
should be established, so that they could thereafter be managed 
effectively if they led to violent conflicts. Now we will move on to 
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other factors or changes happening in AN that lead to the need to 
reconsider the original ownership structure.  
5.3 Factors leading to reconsideration of the structure 
In chapter 4.4, we described the changing forces in three dimensions. 
One from the owners' perspective, including the changes in the 
owner's strategy, changes in importance of the venture to the owner, 
and changes in the relative bargaining power between the owners. One 
from the owner-venture perspective, including the changes in the 
venture's need for autonomy and owner's need for control. Another 
one from the venture's perspective, including the changes in the 
environments and changes of the success requirement for the venture. 
All these changes may have positive or negative impact on the change 
of the original bargaining agreement and ownership structure. Applied 
to the case of AN, we found that the following changes could be the 
factors that led to the conflicts and the reconsideration of the 
ownership structure.  
 
Changes in VCC's structure 
In the beginning of 1999,VCC was bought by Ford, one of the world's 
largest and most profitable automotive companies. The deal would 
allow VCC to have full access to Ford's engineering, distribution, 
purchasing, marketing, and financial resources (Ford annual report 
1999). This meant that VCC would have a more secure future through 
increased financial resources, greater economies of scale, and the 
chance for a broader product range. In particular these would apply to 
the significant investments required in both the development of the 
new car generations and in distribution. For Ford, among other things, 
it would equally share the 49 percent ownership of AN. This big 
change in VCC's structure may have a strong impact on its attitude 
and strategy towards AN. On the one hand, VCC may expect more, 
even full, control over AN in order to freely realise its or its new 
owner- Ford's new strategy and demands for the venture. The shared 
decision making with TWR would tie up its hands. On the other hand, 
the product manufactured in AN may not be as strategically important 
to VCC as before since it already secured and strengthened its 
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position through being part of Ford. But this reduced "urgent need" 
for AN/TWR together with its increased internal strength could only 
give VCC more bargaining power on the following renegotiation 
process with TWR. However, if not used properly, it would cause a 
disaster as happened later that the production had been stopped and 
the employees had been dismissed for almost three weeks.  
 
Bargaining power shift 
Another factor that causes a bargaining power shift between partners 
is when the resources that one partner contributes to the joint venture 
become more or less valuable than those contributed by other partners. 
Lorange and Roos (1993) consider it as a natural and pragmatic 
evolution that the partner who provides, e.g. the marketing input 
becomes increasingly dominant in the role of executing the joint 
venture activities, while the other partner who is providing the 
technology may become less and less active after the initial 
technological learning has been completed and the know-how 
transferred. In our case, we do not know how TWR protected its core 
competence when providing AN with the racing image, nor are we 
sure whether this technology transfer had been completed or not. 
However, considering several years cooperation between VCC and 
TWR in AN, and considering the production of 10 000-15 000 cars in 
1998 and 1999, we assume that VCC (or AN) has learnt more than 
enough to produce C70 cars without the support of TWR, at least 
TWR's contribution would become less and less valuable in the eyes 
of VCC. At the same time, VCC may view their contributions to the 
venture more valuable and crucial, since from 1999 they started to pay 
what they called "a temporary high transferring price" to AN. This 
means they didn't think it was their responsibility or compulsory to do 
so by agreement, but implied it was their kindness and additional 
contribution to the venture.  
 
If this is the case, it is wise to let VCC be more active in charge of the 
ventures' activities to balance VCC's perception of "inequity" of give-
and-take, or it is time to negotiate a friendly buy out of TWR if their 
needs for cooperation in AN diminish. At this time, As Lorange and 
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Roos (1993) point out, if both partners want to exert tight control over 
the venture, the relationships between the partners will face 
difficulties and the venture may be terminated later.  
 
Conflicts over "Clio"-TWR wants more power 
However, TWR appeared reluctant to become a passive owner. In 
order to reinforce its control over AN and weaken the increasing 
power of VCC as a sole customer, sometime in 1999 TWR negotiated 
a cooperation with Renault to build a special variant of the "Clio" 
model, intending to let AN take the responsibility. After being 
rejected by VCC, TWR instead delegated this task to its subsidiary 
TWR Sweden located in the same area as AN. Obviously, VCC would 
not be happy with this action, since TWR's cooperation with other 
carmakers may to some extent threaten VCC's competitive advantages 
and cause competitors. Consequently conflicts occurred between the 
two owners.  
 
Here we argue that a good trusting relationship between the partners is 
very important, which will encourage the partners to solve the 
conflicts in a good way. Conflicts are not necessarily bad things, since 
very often they are inevitable in managing a joint venture with several 
independent partner companies involved. Mockler (1999) addresses 
that conflicts provide opportunities for partners to get to know one 
another better and build a base for synergistic creativity by using 
diversity to build new directions, communicate and reinforce policies 
and create new opportunities. Therefore, it is a matter of how to treat 
and handle the conflicts.  
5.4 Theoretical reflection on how the conflicts were 
handled 
Based on the theoretical framework and our investigation on this 
AutoNova case, we feel that, in general, two mechanisms are usually 
involved when handling the conflicts, one is power-based and the 
other is negotiation-based. In other words, there are two ways when 
 66 
dealing with conflicts, one is the negative way and the other is the 
positive way. 
5.4.1 Power-based 
The power-based means that the partners may rely on those control 
mechanisms such as the legal documents, formal agreements, equity 
shares, voting rights, and/or the composition of the board to solve the 
conflicts. These powers are basically generated from those equity 
capital resources and other contractual resources provided by the 
partners. We consider it a negative way because those mechanisms are 
often used to stop or to prevent the venture or their partner from 
implementing certain activities or decisions in a way that does not 
induce a cooperative spirit, which conversely may damage the trust 
among the partners and between the partner and the venture. In 
addition, it is nearly impossible to have the contracts/agreements that 
are so detailed and comprehensive that they cover everything, and are 
so clearly written that everybody would have the same interpretation 
and understanding. Thus referring to the contract might make the 
conflicts even more controversial and unsolvable.  
 
Unfortunately, this was the way that TWR and VCC chose while 
handling their conflicts - both of them had maximally exerted their 
respective power, which turned out to be an even worse situation.  
 
Both of them refer to the contracts/agreements 
When the two owners had the different opinions of AN's 1998 account 
and the transferring price that should be paid between VCC and AN, 
both owners referred to the contracts/or agreements, however, they got 
different answers. Though we argue that using contracts to solve 
disputes is not a good way and may damage trust and ongoing 
relationships, we suggest that a good, clear, understandable contract is 
necessary since the only time partners need to refer to the contract is 
when there are conflicts. Contracts are not expected to cover 
everything, but they are expected not to be confusing.  
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Go to arbitration 
Regarding AN's 1998 account, finding no way to go, in September 
1999 VCC and TWR turned to arbitration to solve their conflicts. 
Here one can ask a question, how could the partners keep a good 
relationship with the arbitration going on? Without a good 
relationship between the two owners how could the venture continue 
and last? 
 
VCC exerts its power 
VCC started to use its power as both owner and sole customer. First it 
withdrew its two board members from AN, then it offered a price for 
buying out TWR. Considered as a disgraceful offer and rejected by 
TWR, VCC finally held its most powerful weapon - terminated the 
"temporary higher transferring price". Leaving alone the validity and 
reasonability of this "temporary higher transferring price", here we 
argue that this sudden action would do nothing good but create even 
more tension in the relationships and deteriorate the situation, causing 
an ownership war which finally befell between the two owners. 
Probably VCC thought that TWR had no choice but to sell its shares 
cheaply. But did VCC foresee the following reaction of TWR? Had 
VCC foreseen it, would it still have done so? 
 
TWR exerts  its power as the reaction 
As a majority owner, TWR immediately responded by ordering AN to 
stop the car delivery. Followed by another round of the unsolved 
ownership fight, TWR thereafter stopped the production of AN. Then 
in the following three weeks, nothing was settled but the increased 
number of dismissed employees and finished cars waiting for their 
end-customers. Obviously TWR would not care about these. If there 
were one between VCC and TWR who was more responsible, that 
should be VCC, since the employees are Swedish, the cars are Volvos, 
and the suppliers and customers are also VCC's. Who loses more? 
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Stalemate 
The whole situation fell into a stalemate. The owners used up their 
power, and there was no way to go anymore except solving the 
ownership question. However, the only way to solve the ownership 
question was by negotiation. Owners had to calm down, sit together, 
review the conflicts, and find out a solution, not by raw power they 
had exercised before which proved to be not effective, but by a win-
win negotiation that could satisfy both.  
5.4.2 Negotiation-based  
Unlike using the raw power, which is a means of winding up the other 
partner's behaviour or forcing the other one to ‘surrender’, the purpose 
of negotiation is to find a way both partners are able to agree, which 
involves both partners' enthusiasm of cooperation and their 
willingness to compromise. Negotiation is a positive and effective 
way to handle the conflicts, but it needs a win-win attitude based on 
open communications, good relationship, and trust between partners 
which are mainly derived from and developed by those non-
contractual resources contributed by the partners. A win-win position 
and win-win attitude is necessary since joint venture is not a zero-sum 
game where one partner gains what the other loses, but rather one in 
which there are solutions benefiting both partners. This means that the 
direction of negotiation is not to maximise partner concessions but to 
move both parties to the positions where benefits to both are 
enhanced. Building trust is the most important task for the parties 
since it is the best way to solve the conflicts that have occurred and 
also it is a crucial factor for the negotiation success. Trust can prompt 
partners freely to communicate with each other and better understand 
each other, therefore handling the conflicts and negotiations easily, 
friendlily and effectively.  
 
In the absence of trust, venture partners’ expectations are likely to go 
unfulfilled, exacerbating suspicion and disappointment and leading to 
a vicious cycle. This is what happened in this case. From the time 
both parties started referring to the contract and arbitration to solve 
their conflicts, trust had already disappeared (if ever existed before). 
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The bad relationship impeded their further communication and 
negotiation to solve the conflicts, and negatively encouraged them to 
use the raw power inappropriately, making their relationship even 
worse and the conflicts even more intensified.  
 
However, they had to come back to the negotiations, as said before, 
they had no more raw power to exert. One can imagine that with such 
a bad relationship how could a negotiation produce a win-win 
solution? Trust is easy to damage but extremely hard to rebuild. A 
negotiation will not efficiently and effectively solve the conflicts if 
there is a climate without trust, but full of anger and complaint. That 
is why during the three weeks after the halt of production, the owners 
VCC and TWR still could not work out a solution through their trial 
negotiations, until Ford's director arrived, as a moderator but the 
owner of VCC as well. How he has influenced is unknown and out of 
the scope of our thesis, but the final solution is that VCC becomes an 
absolute majority owner who takes 75 percent of AN with the rest 
being purchased in 2003.  
 
Had they spent more time building a trusting relationship, had they be 
more cooperative when conflicts occurred, had they be not so 'selfish' 
but feeling the positions from the other's side, had they be more 
cautious and patient while handling the conflicts, the ownership 
question would not have been solved in such a unpleasant and painful 
way. Joint venture is a means to an end, circumstances change, when 
the original ownership structure does not facilitate the realisation of a 
firm's strategic objectives or is not operationally feasible, it is time to 
negotiate a necessary reconfiguration, buy out, or even termination of 
the venture. But it should be carried in a friendly and peaceful way 
with the possibility of future cooperation preserved. A manner of 
acrimony departure not only sends powerful signals about the partner 
firms to others, but also affects the reputations of the firms. The 
ownership solution in AN means that the current conflicts between 
TWR and VCC were temporarily solved but TWR is still a partner 
with 25 percent shares. Can this solution guarantee that no new 
conflicts will occur during the following period before VCC takes  
full control of AN in 2003? The answer lies in, among other things, 
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how much power has been authorised to TWR, how the venture AN is 
going to be managed, and whether both parties have learnt something 
from this experience and will rebuild their relationships in the future.  
5.4.3 Other factors - general manager/union/staff 
During the conflicts, AN's general manager Mike Flweitt apparently 
took his majority owner, TWR's side. He is a "pity guy" since he had 
to face a great deal of ambiguity meeting both parents' mind and 
assuring the interest of the venture. It is really a difficult task. As 
killing (1983) indicates, a successful JVGM has to have a very high 
tolerance for ambiguity and excellent negotiating skills to avoid or 
alleviate conflicts and tensions between his parents. It is not wise that 
he put his loyalty to either owner taking any side during the conflicts. 
Since this could only damage his credibility with the other partner and 
the working relationship with venture's functional managers and 
employees who may come from both parents. Therefore the chance he 
could communicate and negotiate with both owners to solve the 
conflicts diminished. Conversely, the tension was more strained.  
 
We see a “good thing” during the conflicts, that is the attitude of AN's 
employees and the union. At the beginning, they did not take any 
sides. They gave their loyalty to the venture itself, and expected the 
owners to find a solution for the best interest of AN. Disappointed by 
the way the owners had handled the conflicts, they broke their silence 
and demanded that VCC to take over the venture, since they thought, 
considering the strength and competence, the venture would have a 
better future if owned by VCC rather than by TWR. There is a healthy 
corporate culture here within the venture at the employees' level - they 
were not misled by those conflicts; they did not block their ideas by 
misplaced allegiance to the respective parents; they did see their 
allegiance to the venture first and consider the venture's interest first. 
It is difficult to say whether their voice had been weighted by the 
involved owners or had any influence that could prompt the owners to 
resolve their ownership question more rationally. However, the final 
solution was what the employees had expected and this could be good 
for AN's future. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion  
6.1 A brief recapitulation over the case 
Over the investigated time period (approximately from the beginning 
of 2000 to the end of March, 2000) the three large conflicts namely, 
the 1998 account, the price, and the ownership question, were 
interconnected with each other. The basic problems lay in their 
original ownership structure where VCC was a minority owner but 
also a sole customer. The two owners' long time inability to solve the 
conflicts over 1998 account damaged the relationships between the 
partners and caused difficulties for their further cooperation, leading 
them to want to buyout each other. 
 
The original ownership structure was a product of the relative 
bargaining power between the two partners, which resulted that one 
owner TWR had more formal control over the venture through its 51 
percent majority equity shares and the other owner VCC gained more 
effective control over the venture through among other things their 
absolute supplier-buyer relationships. Many uncertainties have been 
identified in our analysis (chapter 5.2) as the potential problems, and a 
good relationship and careful management have been argued to reduce 
these uncertainties. 
 
The factors (chapter 5.3) that caused the potential problems to the 
intense conflicts and led the partners to reconsider their original 
ownership structure are found to be the decreased needs between the 
partners, the strategic change in VCC's structure, the potential 
cooperation between TWR and other carmakers, and finally the bad 
relationships between the partners. We argued that conflicts were not 
necessarily ‘bad things’. If partners could treat them positively, 
conflicts could provide opportunities for partners to better understand 
each other and create new opportunities for their ongoing cooperation. 
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How the partners handled their conflicts have been presented and 
analysed (chapter 5.4). It is found that a power-based attitude towards 
the conflicts is harmful and produces a stalemate situation. A 
negotiation based on the mutual benefit and win-win attitude is 
advocated to be a positive way to handle the conflicts. When it was 
necessary to negotiate a reconfiguration of the venture or buy out 
another partner, the manner, whether it was in a friendly way or a 
bitter way, has been argued to be the most important, since it may 
affect involved parties' reputations and the possibilities for them to 
cooperate in the future.  
 
So far, we have fulfilled our main purpose that is declared in chapter 
1.3. Our second purpose is to give some considerations when forming 
or managing a joint venture, which will be presented below in chapter 
6.2. These considerations are based on the connections between the 
theoretical framework and the empirical findings of AutoNova’s case. 
Therefore we are not intending to give a complete picture when 
managing a joint venture, but to give the considerations based on what 
have happened in AutoNova.  
6.2 Considerations 
6.2.1 The concept of ownership 
Our case study shows that ownership is a broad concept with the 
combination of different dimensions of resources contributed by the 
partners, namely, equity capital, contractual resources, and non-
contractual resources, which therefore influence the partners' control 
over different levels. 
 
Equity shares confer certain legal rights to determine the overall 
direction of a joint venture. It is seen as a product of the relative 
bargaining power between the partners and associated with the formal 
control. However, a majority equity ownership does not always equal 
effective control over the venture. 
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Partners may realise their effective control over the venture through 
those critical resources they provide to the venture, such as the 
technology, the supplier chain, and the market access. Market access 
is seen to be more durable than the technological know-how 
especially where the product and process technology changes rapidly 
and where the technology transfer is likely to be accomplished by the 
subsequent organisational learning.  
 
The quality of those non-contractual resources which among other 
things lies in the attitude, knowledge and skills of the managers and 
employees is very important, since it reflects the level of commitment 
of partners and generates moral authorities through goodwill, trust, 
and cooperative spirit among the parties involved.  
6.2.2 Control mechanism 
Our case study indicates that partners that over-rely on those formal 
agreements, voting rights on the board, and/or the resource-related 
power to control the venture's or its partners' activities or to solve the 
conflicts is not an effective and positive way. It may damage the 
relationships and cause difficulties for the partners' ongoing 
cooperation. It may also result in a stalemate situation if neither party 
has the absolute power to break the impasse.  
 
It implies that a good management control system should rely on a 
unanimous agreement in their minds based on good relationships, 
trust, and a cooperative attitude among the partners to coordinate the 
venture's activities and to solve the conflicts occurring. 
 
Though we do not advocate partners to rely on the contract or 
agreement, for the reasons explained above, however, we still suggest 
that a clearly written contract or agreement is necessary. It could not 
cover everything, but it should not be confusing especially over the 
crucial and sensitive issues.  
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6.2.3 Ownership structure design 
Our case study shows that when one partner has the formal control but 
lacks corresponding resources while the other partner has the effective 
control through the crucial resources but lacks formal control, it easily 
leads to conflicts. Building a good relationship and an open 
communication climate are suggested as improving the understanding 
between the partners, to avoid the conflicts, and to solve the conflicts 
easily and effectively.  
 
Though it is often a product of the original bargaining power between 
the partners, an appropriate structure should facilitate the realisation 
of partners' strategic objectives and be operationally feasible. 
Whatever it is, a so-called dominant parent venture or a shared 
management venture, without the partners’ willingness to cooperate, 
neither will succeed. The 'goodness' of fit among the objectives, 
ownership resources, and control needs a long time to test and retest. 
It is important that the partners do not lose sight of their motivations 
for cooperating and establish a positive attitude to allow the 
subsequent changes to adapt to the dynamic changing needs.  
6.2.4 Changing forces 
Our case study shows that the circumstances change over time, 
partners' strategic objectives over the venture, their attitude and the 
need of control over the venture, and the relative bargaining power 
and the needs between the partners will also change. All these changes 
will have an impact on the original agreements and lead to a 
reconsideration of the structure. The changes may be inevitable but 
could be a healthy evolution for the venture and both parties. Partners 
should be prepared for the possible changes, and negotiate a better 
solution based on a continuously cooperative spirit and a win-win 
attitude. 
 
The end of the cooperation or the reconfiguration of the ownership 
structure does not mean the failure of the venture. However, whether 
it ends in a painful and bitter way or in a peaceful parting of ways 
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with the possibility of future cooperations preserved is critical. The 
manner in which a venture ends sends powerful signals about the 
partner firms to others, affecting the reputations of the firms. 
Therefore, top managers have to be aware of their responsibility in 
ensuring that the windup of cooperation is accomplished without 
impairment of the firm's ability to form future ones.  
6.2.5 Vertical relationships 
Our case study emphasises that when vertical relationships exist in the 
venture structure, it should be carefully designed and managed to 
ensure the equal benefits of all involved parties. If a vertical 
relationship creates a win-lose position between the owners or 
between the owner and the venture, this relationship will be in great 
danger and the venture will not last long.  
 
The study also implies that if the venture is restricted from dealing 
with outsiders, in the long run it is not good for venture's own 
development and full evolution as a third independent entity with its 
own vision, mission and strategy. Without the competition and 
operational flexibility, ventures are unlikely to be cost effective and be 
motivated. 
6.2.6 Relationships 
Our study witnesses that without a good relationship built on trust 
between the partners and between the partners and the venture, their 
ongoing cooperation and any necessary negotiations will face 
difficulties and the conflicts occurred will not be effectively solved. 
We suggest that partners should put more efforts on building trust 
within the venture, since in the long term it may produce more 
‘dividends’ than those financial and contractual resources and 
generate indefinite moral authority which is more effective than those 
formal control mechanisms.  
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6.3 Shortcomings of our study 
The conflicts that we identified in AutoNova are limited to what was 
mentioned in the press during the time period from the beginning of 
2000 to the end of March 2000, therefore there might be other 
conflicts that had ever happened between the partners (VCC and 
TWR) but might not be mentioned in the press, and there might be 
other factors that led the two partners (VCC and TWR) to reconsider 
their original ownership structure. This leads to the “story” of 
AutoNova and hence our analysis of the conflicts possibly not being a 
complete picture.  
 
However, we believe it will not affect the overall direction of our 
study since our main aim is not to provide a solution to any specific 
conflicts, but rather to advocate a perception and an attitude toward 
the potential conflicts or problems within the ownership structure. 
Another reason is that we think conflicts are inevitable when 
managing a joint venture where two or more partners are involved. 
Therefore whether the conflicts that have been presented in our thesis 
are complete or not is not that important. What is important is how to 
handle the conflicts and whether there is a good attitude of partners 
towards the conflicts.  
6.4 Suggestions for future research 
Joint venture is an interesting topic since many problems will arise 
when managing such a company with more than two parent 
companies involved. In our study, we focus on the ownership and 
control. Future research could focus on how venture and partners' 
contributions should be valued when partners are going to buyout 
each other's shares.  
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